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INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 1999, New Orleans–based rapper Juvenile told
the world “Cash Money Records taking over for the ’99 [and] the
2000.”1 “Back That Azz Up” was released as a single, and Juvenile
proved he had written a check his ass could cash.2 Twenty years later,
“Back That Azz Up” is “the theme song for the proverbial cookout and
the national anthem of Twerkanda.”3 It is hard to find “[a]nyone
* Professor, Howard University School of Law. I am indebted to Aleena Asperville
(Class of 2019), Miles Taylor (Class of 2018), and Vianca Simpson (Class of 2016). In ad-
dition, this Article would not have been possible without the support of Dean Danielle
Holley-Walker, Raaechael Johnson, Tiffany Harris, Assistant Dean Ann Marie Waterman,
and Dorothy Q. Thomas. I would also like to thank Layla Abi-Falah and the members
of the William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice. Any errors are my
own. Finally, there is an accompanying Strip(ped) Speech playlist readers can access at
https://music.apple.com/us/playlist/strip-ped-speech/pl.u-yZyVEAxTYgp7oK.
1. JUVENILE, LIL WAYNE & MANNIE FRESH, Back That Azz Up, on 400 DEGREEZ (Cash
Money Records 1998).
2. According to Urban Dictionary.com, “ ‘Your mouth is writing checks your ass can’t
cash,’ . . . means that talk is cheap relative to performance, or that promising something
and delivering on it are two different things. A phrase similar in meaning is ‘Money
talks, bullshit walks.’ ” Your mouth is writing checks your ass can’t cash, URBAN DICTION-
ARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Your%20mouth%20is%0writing
%20checks%20your%20ass%20can%27t%20cash [https://perma.cc/B8VB-Y6QC] (last
visited Nov. 4, 2019).
3. Michael Harriot, On the 20th Anniversary of ‘Back That Azz Up,’ We’re Still Drop-
ping It Like It’s Hot, THE ROOT (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.theroot.com/on-the-20th-anni
versary-of-back-dat-azz-up-were-still-1832853771 [https://perma.cc/CQ8S-VVCR]; Justin
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between the ages of 20 and 55 [who] has [never] a) thrown a twerk
to this song; b) caught a twerk to this song; and/or c) carried with them
fond twerk memories” with this song as the soundtrack.4 It is a party
anthem that owes a deep debt to “[t]he strip clubs where [it] is un-
officially written into its constitution.”5 Whether in the clubs or in
the streets, “[t]he fact that America even knows what twerking is
(and didn’t allow Miley Cyrus to drive a proverbial stake through its
proverbial heart) is thanks to the bold brilliance of the black girls
who (created it and who) swing it, and to Juvenile, Mannie Fresh and
Lil Wayne.”6 Twenty years on, most backing up happens nowhere
near a strip club.7 Rather, “the backing up of azz takes place at baby
showers, . . . repast[s],” wedding receptions, company picnics,8 and
“high-cotton” black tie galas. The song is so ubiquitous that you can
hear and dance to it without ever stepping foot into a club.9
The influence of songs like “Back That Azz Up” outside the strip
club has a lot to do with a musical subgenre that has “dominated the
Tinsley, Juvenile’s “Back That Azz Up,” 20 years later, THE UNDEFEATED (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://theundefeated.com/features/juveniles-back-that-azz-up-20-years-later [https://perma
.cc/2H42-8UK9]. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “twerking” as dancing “in a sexu-
ally provocative manner, using thrusting movements of the bottom and hips while in a
low, squatting stance,” and identifies the first use of the word in 1820 when a “twirk” was
a “twitch.” Twerk Dates Back to 1820, Says Oxford English Dictionary, BBC (June 25,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-33265370 [https://perma.cc/2Q8G
-R8NJ]. The word was first used as a verb in 1848, its current spelling was adopted in 1901,
and its current usage dates back to “the early 1990s New Orleans ‘bounce’ music scene.”
Id. Miley Cyrus “infamously” twerked with Robin Thicke during her performance at the
2013 Video Music Awards and is credited with having helped popularize the dance.
Courtney Brogle, Miley Cyrus is Back to Twerk, N.Y. POST (July 18, 2019), https://
pagesix.com/2019/07/18/miley-cyrus-is-back-to-twerk [https://perma.cc/N78T-ZRZL]; see
also Jessica Pressler, Miley Cyrus’ Summer of Love, HARPER’S BAZAAR (July 13, 2017),
https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/features/a10290838/miley-cyrus [https://perma
.cc/L63N-QCLM]. Big Freedia, a New Orleans–based rapper and ambassador of Bounce
music, even features “legendary shake team and Bounce dance moves [include] ‘the twerk’
(popularized by Miley Cyrus in 2013) . . .” during tour performances. BIG FREEDIA, https://
www.bigfreedia.com/bio [https://perma.cc/M6RP-25BB] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
4. Tinsley, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Id.; see also Jacob “34” Koertge, Mannie Fresh Breaks Down the Making of Juve-
nile’s Biggest Hit, AMBROSIA FOR HEADS (Feb. 17, 2019), https://ambrosiaforheads.com
/2019/02/mannie-fresh-making-of-juvenile-back-beat-video [https://perma.cc/Y95A-USY7]
(quoting Mannie Fresh who claims “the most iconic sound of ‘Back That Azz Up,’ . . . the
thing that makes girls shake they ass, is the string line in it”). Audre Lorde describes the
type of power Tinsley attributes to “black girls” as “the power of the erotic.” AUDRE LORDE,
Uses of the Erotic, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 53–59 (1984). According
to Lorde, “[w]e have been warned against [the power of the erotic] all our lives by the male
world, which values this [power] enough to keep women around in order to exercise it in
the service of men, but which fears this same [power] too much to examine the possibilities
of it within themselves.” Id. at 53–54.
7. Harriot, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. See id.
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black pop-culture scene for decades.”10 Ten years before Cash Money
Records released “Back That Azz Up,” Luther Campbell and 2 Live
Crew broke new ground with “As Nasty As They Wanna Be,” the “first
southern rap album to go platinum.”11 2 Live Crew showed us how
to chart the path to fame that now runs from a select group of strip
clubs to radio airplay, awards, and platinum records.12 Uncle Luke
and his compatriots are also responsible for securing First Amend-
ment protection for the sexually explicit music associated with strip
clubs.13 While the music is fully protected against content-based reg-
ulation, the same cannot be said for either the strip clubs or the
strippers who work in those clubs.14
Both the music and the stripping are speech that communicate
sexually explicit messages; however, the First Amendment allows
them to be regulated differently.15 On the one hand, music like “As
10. Kirsten West Savali, “ ‘Selling Hot P—sy’: Strippers Talk Sexuality, Misogyny and
Stereotypes, THE ROOT (June 8, 2018, 12:55 PM), https://www.theroot.com/selling-hot-p-sy
-strippers-talk-sexuality-misogyny-1790855572 [https://perma.cc/LQ2R-RBCP]. According
to Justin Tinsley, the influence of Cash Money Records and Back That Azz Up on white
culture is also demonstrated by The Oxford English Dictionary’s adding “Bling Bling”
to its pages in 2003. Tinsley, supra note 3.
11. Luther Campbell, Today’s Rappers Owe Everything to ‘As Nasty As They Wanna
Be,’ MIAMI NEW TIMES (July 22, 2014, 8:30 AM), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news
/todays-rappers-owe-everything-to-as-nasty-as-they-wanna-be-6543806 [https://perma.cc
/L734-JE9F]. Campbell claims to have “provided the blueprint for Cash Money Records,
Bad Boy Entertainment, Maybach Music Group, and every other independent hip-hop
entertainment company that came after Luke Records.” Id.
12. Devin Friedman, Make it Reign: How an Atlanta Strip Club Runs the Music
Industry, GQ (July 8, 2015), https://www.gq.com/story/atlanta-strip-club-magic-city?&fb
clid=IwAR14VNVqa1Sb4thgN2SuoiQlrJG9nk06g1rRhR0J-KFdJS4rHsy-8QHGesU
[https://perma.cc/WDJ6-VFBR].
The music you hear in Magic City isn’t the music you might expect at a strip
club. Magic City Mondays are the most important nights in the most im-
portant club in the most important city in the hip-hop industry. Magic City
is the place where you hear music before anyone else does, and where it is
decided if that music gets played anywhere else . . . . Atlanta is, especially,
the de facto center of the hip-hop industry, and it is Magic City—and the
small number of strip clubs like it—that operates as the underground linch-
pin of that industry. If hip-hop were Silicon Valley, Magic City would be the
place venture capitalists would loiter, looking for talent. “Ninety-nine percent
of the time, the first place you ever heard a song is Magic City,” said DJ Esco,
who, when it comes to music, pretty much controls Magic City.
Id.; see also Mike Jordan, An Oral History of Magic City, ATLANTA MAG. (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://www.atlantamagazine.com/oral-history-magic-city [https://perma.cc/7W75-V2QD].
13. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972), abrogated by 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 533–34 (1996) (nude dancing protected by First Amend-
ment); Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138–39 (11th Cir. 1992) (“As Nasty As
We Wanta Be” is not obscene; therefore it is protected by First Amendment).
14. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570–71 (1991); LaRue, 409 U.S.
at 118.
15. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 317 (2000); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566,
581; Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 138–39.
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Nasty As They Wanna Be” and “Back That Azz Up” cannot be
criminalized unless the lyrics are obscene within the meaning of the
First Amendment.16 On the other hand, strippers and the clubs in
which they work can be regulated based on government concerns
about the negative secondary effects of the strippers’ speech on the
communities in which the clubs do business rather than any concerns
about obscenity.17 The secondary effects of this nonobscene speech
include the crime and urban blight of “ghetto life,” which strip clubs,
strippers, and this subgenre of rap music both transact and glorify.18
The compulsion to regulate the music, the strip clubs and the
stripping, however, is based, in large part, on the view of this cultural
milieu as producing low-value speech that threatens social order and
morality.19 To address this threat, the First Amendment makes its
protection a function of both forum and form.20 It depends on forum
in the sense that sexually explicit speech in public accommodations
can be regulated in ways that the same speech in the privacy of
one’s home cannot.21 It depends on form in the sense that the music
and the dancing work together to convey the same sexually explicit
message, but the former is assessed in terms of obscenity and the lat-
ter is assessed in terms of secondary effects.22 Both forum and form
create an analytical framework that uses the language of secondary
effects to conclude public nudity laws incidentally burden the speech
as understood by the stripper’s intended audience.23 This approach
appears to subordinate the speaker’s intended messages to the lis-
tener’s ability to understand the message in the interest of protect-
ing the public from the crime that is reasonably assumed to follow
as the listener’s reaction to the speech. Although the court names its
16. Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 138–39 (“A work cannot be held obscene unless each
element of the Miller [v. California] test has been met.”).
17. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 295–300; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 561, 582–86.
18. See, e.g., Robin D.G. Kelley, Looking for the “Real” Nigga, in THAT’S THE JOINT!: THE
HIP-HOP STUDIES READER (Murray Forman & Mark Anthony Neal, eds., 2004); David
Frum, The Cultural Roots of Crime: A Conversation About the Rise and Fall of Violence
in America with Criminal Justice Scholar Barry Latzer, THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/the-cultural-roots-of-crime/487583
[https://perma.cc/L6XT-PFOH] (explaining the culture of violence in cities like Detroit and
Los Angeles that identifies the southern “honor culture” with which Blacks “migrated
north in the 20th century . . .”).
19. See Michael Eric Dyson, The Culture of Hip Hop, in THAT’S THE JOINT!: THE HIP-
HOP STUDIES READER 62 (Murray Forman & Mark Anthony Neal, eds., 2004).
20. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.
21. Id.
22. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118 (conceding that “some of the performances to which these
regulations address themselves are within the limits of the constitutional protection of
freedom of expression . . . ”); see Grant Wahlquist, Achilles’ Heel: Revisiting the Supreme
Court’s Nude Dancing Cases, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 695, 722 (2011).
23. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 295.
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doctrine secondary effects, it appears to focus on the speech’s primary,
not secondary, effects.24
The differential treatment the music and the dancing receive is
established in three federal court cases decided between 1991 and
2000.25 In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. and City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
the Supreme Court concluded that generally applicable public nudity
laws could be enforced inside strip clubs to ban nude dancing because
“requiring . . . pasties and g-strings” incidentally burdens the strip-
pers’ speech.26 This type of ban would not pass constitutional muster
if applied to either the public accommodations in which the women
perform nor the music to which they strip.27 In Luke Records, Inc. v.
Navarro, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Florida could not use its
criminal obscenity law to ban the sale of 2 Live Crew’s “As Nasty As
They Wanna Be” album.28 The album was not obscene within the
meaning of the First Amendment because it failed to satisfy all
three parts of the First Amendment’s definition of obscenity.29 Con-
sequently, the corporeal speech of the women who dance at strip
clubs is less protected than either the music to which they dance or
the clubs in which they speak.30
These three cases demonstrate that while the messages ex-
pressed by both the stripping in Barnes and Pap’s A.M. and the music
in Luke Records, Inc. are sexually explicit, the First Amendment does
not require the speech to be treated the same.31 The dancing can be
banned without being adjudged obscene.32 The music, however, can-
not be banned unless it is obscene.33 The difference between the music
and dancing is a matter of both perspective and voice. The music usu-
ally tells male stories about women, many of whom are strippers.
The dancing is the means by which women tell their own stories.
24. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 314 (1988) (distinguishing District of Columbia ordi-
nance from Renton, Washington’s zoning ordinance because the former involved an
“asserted justification [that] focuses only on the content of picket signs and their primary
and direct emotive impact on their audience”) (emphasis in original).
25. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes, 501 U.S. 560; Luke
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992).
26. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 301 (“The ordinance regulates conduct, and any incidental
impact on the expressive element of nude dancing is de minimus.”); Barnes, 501 U.S. at
567 (“[W]e find that Indiana’s public indecency statute is justified despite its incidental
limitations on some expressive activity.”).
27. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567.
28. Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 138–39.
29. Id.; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); infra Part II.
30. Compare Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 302, and Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580, with Luke
Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 138–39.
31. Compare Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 302, and Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580, with Luke
Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 138–39.
32. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 302; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580.
33. Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 138–39.
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The different constitutional limits on the music and the dancing not
only belies how the two are connected, but also works to restrain
women’s ability to speak in their own voices unmediated by the male
gaze represented in the music. It demonstrates how the First Amend-
ment reinforces the value of strippers as objects in stories told by
men rather than as subjects whose speech allows them to tell their
own stories. This strips women of their voices in largely Black spaces
where many, in fact, are empowered as cultural creators and “taste-
makers.”34 In this space, however, “the stripper’s body [is] a site of
deep controversy in American culture and legal jurisprudence” be-
cause “[h]er dance is seen both as a threat to social order and an act
of expression to be protected.”35
The origin story for the contemporary doctrinal crossroads at
which Barnes, Pap’s A.M., and Luke Records, Inc. are decided begins
in Supreme Court cases decided sixty years earlier.36 This Article
considers the constitutional distinction between obscenity and inde-
cency raised by some rap music and stripping within a six-decade ju-
ridical journey to define the limits of speech and the government
power to regulate speech about sex.37 Part I briefly reviews three sem-
inal obscenity cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1957 and
1969. In Roth v. United States, Book Named “John Cleland’s Mem-
oirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, and
34. Chris Dart, Read This: Inside the Atlanta Strip Club that Supposedly Runs the
Music Industry, AV CLUB (Nov. 16, 2015, 4:59 PM), https://news.avclub.com/read-this-in
side-the-atlanta-strip-club-that-supposedl-1798286442 [https://perma.cc/KA6A-4PRD];
see LORDE, supra note 6, at 54–59; see also L.H. STALLINGS, From the Freaks of Freaknik
to the Freaks of Magic City, in FUNK THE EROTIC: TRANSAESTHETICS AND BLACK SEXUAL
CULTURES 176–79 (2015); Erin Haines Wack & Rebecca Burns, Freaknik: The Rise &
Fall of Atlanta’s Most Infamous Street Party, ATLANTA MAG. (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www
.atlantamagazine.com/90s/freaknik-the-rise-and-fall-of-atlantas-most-infamous-street
-party [https://perma.cc/D5HJ-Y2Z5].
35. Sheerine Alemzadeh, Baring Inequality: Revisiting the Legalization Debate Through
the Lens of Strippers’ Rights, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 339, 341 (2013); see also Amy
Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1108, 1111 (2002) (using a “feminist lens” to reveal how the Court’s “nude dancing cases
are built on a foundation of sexual panic driven by dread of female sexuality”). According
to Adler, this “previously hidden gender anxiety . . . has implications not only for the law
of nude dancing, but for First Amendment law more broadly”). Id.
36. See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Book Named “John Clelland’s
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
37. State and local governments use the Tenth Amendment’s police power to regulate
in this fashion. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Congress lacks a general federal police power. Id.
Therefore, Article I’s Commerce Clause is the basis for federal laws that criminalize obscen-
ity and regulate indecency. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Randy E. Barnett, The Proper
Scope of Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 480 (2004); Charles Kellogg-Burdick,
The Meaning of “Police Power,” 214 THE N. AM. REV. 158, 158–65 (1921); Santiago Legarre,
The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 780 (2007).
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Stanley v. Georgia, the Court attempts to define obscenity by strik-
ing a balance between individual liberty and the government’s power
to regulate.38 Part II discusses the seven sexually explicit speech
cases the Supreme Court decided during its 1972–73 term.39 Six of
these cases are like Roth and Memoirs in that they turn on the defini-
tion of obscenity within the meaning of the First Amendment.40 The
seventh case tests the limits of Stanley’s privacy when public accom-
modations licensed to sell liquor feature live nude dancing.41 Part III
traces the Secondary Effects Doctrine as it develops in the space left
unresolved by either the “liquor + nude dancing” or the obscenity
decisions from 1972 and 1973, respectively.42 Zoning to protect public
health, safety, and welfare emerges from this space to justify regu-
lating where adult entertainment establishments can do business
without running afoul of the First Amendment.43 Part IV considers the
Secondary Effects Doctrine as used in both zoning cases and stripping
cases. It also distinguishes the two stripping cases from Luke Re-
cords, Inc. v. Navarro in which the Eleventh Circuit used the consti-
tutional test for obscenity to overturn a conviction based on the
erroneous conclusion that 2 Live Crew’s “As Nasty As They Wanna
Be” was obscene.44 This doctrinal crossroads is where secondary ef-
fects and obscenity allow indecent strippers’ speech to be regulated
more than either where the clubs in which they work are located or
the content of the music associated with those clubs. Treating the
dancing and the music differently means stripping is not assessed as
a matter of obscenity, and the dancers’ speech is stripped of the con-
stitutional protection afforded the musicians’ speech even though
both feature the same sexually explicit content. In the context of this
industry, this privileges men’s voices and messages over women’s
voices and messages. Consequently, the power women exercise in
these spaces both to influence Black popular culture and to exploit the
38. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 563–68; Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418–21; Roth, 354 U.S. at 489–94.
39. See generally Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972),
abrogated by 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
40. Heller, 413 U.S. at 490–94; Miller, 413 U.S. at 36; Orito, 413 U.S. at 145; 12 200-
Foot Reels of 8MM Film, 413 U.S. at 127–30; Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69–70;
Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 119–22. See Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419–21; Roth, 354 U.S. at 489–94.
41. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 110–11.
42. See Miller, 412 U.S. at 36–37; LaRue, 409 U.S. at 116–19.
43. See City of Los Angeles v. Alemeda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Renton
v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976).
44. 960 F. 2d 134, 138–39 (11th Cir. 1992).
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market demand for their speech to improve their bottom line is re-
stricted. The Secondary Effects Doctrine erects, rather than removes,
barriers to women’s empowerment, renders their choices incredible,
and denies their agency, the expression of which is both choosing to
strip and the messages their stripping communicates.
I. DEFINING OBSCENITY AND PRIVACY: PAVING THE WAY FOR
MILLER V. CALIFORNIA (1957–1969)
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court first held obscenity is
not protected by the First Amendment.45 Roth v. United States defined
obscenity as sexually explicit speech that is “utterly without redeem-
ing social importance” and “deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interests.”46 According to this definition, “sex and obscenity
are not synonymous.”47 Therefore, “[t]he portrayal of sex, e.g., in art,
literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny
material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press.”48 Rather, the absence of redeeming social importance coupled
with the content’s encouragement of an excessive interest in sex
makes sexually explicit speech obscene.49
The Court revisited the issue of obscenity eight years later in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts.50 Unlike Roth, Memoirs did not require
45. Roth, 354 U.S. at 492–93.
46. Id. at 484, 487.
In Roth [sic], the primary constitutional question is whether the federal ob-
scenity statute violates the . . . First Amendment . . . . In Alberts [sic], the
primary constitutional question is whether the obscenity provisions of the
California Penal Code invade the freedoms of speech and press as they may
be incorporated in the liberty protected from state action by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 479–80 (footnote omitted). The cases reject the Hicklin test for obscenity and its
focus on the alleged obscenity’s affects on “those whose minds are open to . . . immoral in-
fluences. Id. at 489–94; R v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (Eng.); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 251.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“Material is obscene if, considered as a whole,
its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest, in
nudity, sex or excretion, and if in addition it goes substantially beyond customary limits
of candor in describing or representing such matters. Predominant appeal shall be judged
with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or the
circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for children or other specially sus-
ceptible audience.”).
47. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 484–87; see also Miller v. California, 412 U.S. 15, 21 (1973); Book Named
“John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
50. See 383 U.S. 413 (1996). Between Roth and Memoirs, the Court had occasion to
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the Court to determine if an obscenity law was constitutional.51
Rather, the case was the result of “a civil equity suit brought by the
Attorney General of Massachusetts . . . to have [a] book declared
obscene.”52 The Court used the following restatement of the Roth
definition: “(W)hether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest.”53 The Court went on to iden-
tify the following three elements, all of which “must coalesce” in
order for sexually explicit speech to be obscene, as defined in Roth:
“(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the ma-
terial is utterly without redeeming social value.”54
Like Roth, Memoirs requires all three parts of the definition to
be independently satisfied to be obscene within the meaning of the
First Amendment.55 In addition, all three elements are equally
weighted; indeed, none is dispositive on the issue of obscenity.56
Therefore, “the social value of the book can neither be weighed
decide “obscenity” cases including the following: (1) Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 149
(1959) (holding a strict liability obscenity statute is unconstitutional. “Roth does not rec-
ognize any state power to restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene; and
we think this ordinance’s strict liability feature would tend seriously to have that effect,
by penalizing booksellers, even though they had not the slightest notice of the character of
the books they sold”); (2) Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 489–90 (1962) (striking
down Comstock Act as applied to gay porn intended to be transported from Alexandria,
Virginia to Chicago, Illinois by the U.S. Postal Service and designated by the Alexandria
postmaster as nonmailable because obscene. According to the Court, “Our own indepen-
dent examination of the magazines leads us to conclude that the most that can be said of
them is that they are dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry. But this is not enough to
make them ‘obscene’ ”); and (3) Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (concluding a film
was not obscene under Roth, involved national or local “community” as relevant to de-
fining “contemporary community standards,” and held it was improper to focus only on
part of the film rather than the film in its entirety).
51. Compare Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418, with Roth, 354 U.S. at 479.
52. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 415. The General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 272, § 28C:
requires that the petition commencing the suit be ‘directed against (the)
book by name’ and that an order to show cause ‘why said book[s] should not
be judicially determined to be obscene’ be published in a daily newspaper
and sent by registered mail ‘to all persons interested in the publication.’
Id. at 415. The issue of obscene content presented in Memoirs is very different from the
specific issue raised in Roth v. United States and its companion case, Alberts v. California,
i.e., “[t]he constitutionality of . . . criminal obscenity [statutes] . . . .” Roth, 354 U.S. at
479; see Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418–19.
53. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
54. Id. (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
55. Id.; Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
56. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418–19.
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against nor canceled by its prurient appeal or patent offensive-
ness.”57 The error in this case was the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court’s conclusion that the book both had a “modicum of social
value” and was obscene.58
In 1969, the Court clarified a limit on the government’s authority
to criminalize obscenity based on its prior conclusion that the First
Amendment does not protect it.59 The statute at issue in Stanley v.
Georgia made knowingly possessing obscene materials in one’s home
a crime.60 The case presented neither direct nor circumstantial evi-
dence that Robert Eli Stanley intended to do anything more than
view the seized obscene material in the privacy of his own home.61
The case arose because Roth did not “foreclose an examination of the
constitutional implications of a statute forbidding mere private pos-
session of such material.”62
In a unanimous decision, the Court declared Georgia’s criminal
obscenity statute unconstitutional.63 The majority opinion concluded
that although Georgia had a legitimate interest in regulating com-
mercialized obscenity, it had neither the authority “to control the
moral content of a person’s thoughts” nor the “right to protect the in-
dividual’s mind from the effects of obscenity.”64 To conclude otherwise
“is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment”
as well as with “traditional notions of individual liberty,” which in-
clude individual privacy.65
57. Id. at 419. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s “judgment [was] reversed
as being founded on an erroneous interpretation of a federal constitutional standard.”
Id. at 420.
58. Id. at 420.
59. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
60. Id. at 558–59 n.1.
61. Id. at 566–67.
62. Id. at 564. But see, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 768, 771 (1967) (per
curiam) (suggesting that written materials neither sold to minors nor foisted on unwilling
adults are constitutionally protected in the case of a newsstand proprietor convicted for
selling two paperback books considered obscene to undercover police). See generally Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
63. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
64. Id. at 565; cf. id. at 569–72 (Stewart, J., concurring) (deciding case on Fourth
Amendment grounds).
65. Id. at 565; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Although the case was de-
cided on Fourth Amendment grounds, the underlying offense with which Dollree Mapp
was charged was possession of obscenity. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643. Both Stanley and Mapp
start with searches related to gambling that turn into obscenity conviction because of
obscene materials seized during search. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
Stanley was a bookie whose home was searched pursuant to a federal search warrant “au-
thorizing the search of [Stanley’s] dwelling for certain bookmaking records particularly
described in the warrant.” Stanley v. State, 161 S.E.2d 309, 310 (1968).
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II. REVISITING OBSCENITY: MILLER V. CALIFORNIA AND THE
SUPREME COURT’S 1971 AND 1972 TERMS
Roth, Memoirs, and Stanley left significant terrain unsettled
about the “what” and “where” of obscenity and privacy, respectively.
The Court, however, would soon have the opportunity to clarify ob-
scenity, as well as the limits on government power to regulate access
to obscene materials outside the home.66 In January 1972, the Court
heard initial oral arguments in Miller v. California, United States v.
Orito, and United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film.67
Marvin Miller was convicted of violating California law by “knowingly
distributing obscene matter” by way of a mass unsolicited mailing
to advertise adult materials he offered for sale.68 George Joseph
Orito was charged with “knowingly transport[ing] and carry[ing] in
interstate commerce from San Francisco . . . to Milwaukee . . . by
means of a common carrier, . . . copies of [specified] obscene, lewd,
lascivious, and filthy materials . . . .”69 In United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8MM Film, “graphic material” was transported from
Mexico to Los Angeles where it was “seized as being obscene by cus-
toms officers at . . . Los Angeles Airport.”70 All three appeals were
based on the constitutional protection afforded both speech and
individual privacy.71
Answering the question raised by Miller, Orito, and 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8MM Film proved to be more challenging than the
Court apparently expected when it agreed to hear the cases. By the
time its term closed in June 1972, other cases were winding their way
through the lower courts that raised the same essential issue about
sex, speech, and the First Amendment.72 Scheduling Miller, Orito, and
12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film for reargument allowed the
Court to consider them with four more cases dealing with sexually
66. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139
(1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
67. Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); 12 200-Ft. Reels of 8MM
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
68. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16–17.
69. Orito, 413 U.S. at 140 (finding that “[t]he materials specified included some 83
reels of film, with as many as eight to 10 copies of some of the films”).
70. 12 200-Foot Reels of 8MM Film, 413 U.S. at 125.
71. Miller, 413 U.S. at 36–37; Orito, 413 U.S. 143–45; 12 200-Ft. Reels of 8MM Film,
413 U.S. at 129–30.
72. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109 (1972).
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explicit speech.73 By the time the Court’s new term opened in October
1972, it had added Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,74 Kaplan v. Cali-
fornia,75 Heller v. New York,76 and California v. LaRue to its docket.77
Six of the seven cases raised the question, “what is obscene within
the meaning of the Constitution?”78 By contrast, the seventh case,
LaRue, turned not on the First Amendment protections to which the
nude dancing might be entitled, but rather on California’s authority
to withhold liquor licenses from strip clubs because of the undesir-
able combination of nudity and alcohol.79
A. Miller v. California: Obscenity Clarified
Miller v. California was “the first time since Roth was decided
in 1957, [that] a majority of [the] Court . . . agreed on concrete guide-
lines to isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from expression protected by
the First Amendment.”80 The Miller test identifies the “basic guide-
lines” for a trier of fact in an obscenity case as follows:
(a) whether the “average person applying contemporary commu-
nity standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole,
73. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37; Orito, 413 U.S. 145; 12 200-Ft. Reels of 8MM Film, 413
U.S. at 130. See Heller, 413 U.S. 483; Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49; Kaplan, 413
U.S. 115; LaRue, 409 U.S. 109. While reargument is uncommon, it is not unprecedented.
Among the factors that may result in a case being reargued are justices needing “infor-
mation from the parties on issues not previously raised in the briefs or during oral argu-
ments,” “one or more justices [having] missed [the initial] oral arguments, and justices
being “uncertain about either (1) the policy they individually wish to pursue, or (2) the
policy that the Court will enunciate in its decision.” Valarie Hoekstra & Timothy Johnson,
Delaying Justice: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Hear Rearguments, 56 POL. RES. Q. 243,
351–60 (2003) (reviewing all formally decided cases with rearguments between 1946 and
1985); see also Adam Liptak, Deadlocks and Rearguments: What’s Ahead for the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/us/politics/dead
locks-and-rearguments-whats-ahead-for-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/2GLP
-85CM] (discussing reargument as an option when a justice dies or retires, the remaining
justices are deadlocked, and the newly appointed justice’s vote is needed to break the tie).
74. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49.
75. Kaplan, 413 U.S. 115.
76. Heller, 413 U.S. 483.
77. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109.
78. Heller, 413 U.S. at 492–93; Miller, 413 U.S. at 30; Orito, 413 U.S. at 143; 12 200-
Ft. Reels of 8MM Film, 413 U.S. at 125; Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 54–55;
Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 118–19.
79. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 114.
80. Miller, 413 U.S. at 29. Note that the court equates “hard core pornography” with
obscenity. Id. This language, however, is inexact because while all obscenity may also be
hard core pornography, not all hard core pornography is obscene. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers
Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333–34 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)
(holding Indianapolis’ Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance violates the First Amend-
ment because it is a content-based regulation of material that is not obscene within the
meaning of the First Amendment).
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appeals to the prurient interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts
or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or sci-
entific value.81
If the trier of fact cannot answer “yes” to all three parts of the Miller
test, then the material under review cannot be obscene.82 If sexually
explicit expression is obscene, however, then it falls outside of what
the First Amendment protects.83 This means a regulation that targets
obscenity because of its content is assessed under a less demanding
level of judicial review than the strict scrutiny usually called for when
nonobscene speech is regulated in this manner.84
The first part of the Miller test restates the Memoirs version of
the consolidated Roth rule.85 Sexually explicit speech is assessed from
the perspective of the average person using contemporary commu-
nity standards to determine if the speech appeals to the prurient
interest.86 Contemporary community standards allow for some in-
terest in sexual matters.87 Prurience is involved only when the speech
appeals to an “excessive” interest in sex.88 The government can
legitimately exercise its power to address the threat the “crass com-
mercial exploitation of sex” poses to “family life, community welfare,
and the development of human personality.”89 It cannot do so, how-
ever, if contemporary community standards indicate otherwise.90
When the “tone of . . . society” is threatened by those who buy and
sell sexually explicit speech, it is the “right of the Nation and of the
States [to act] to maintain a decent society.”91 This right, however,
81. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 27.
84. Id. at 29–30.
85. Id.; see also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
86. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 30; see, e.g., Jacobellius v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (regarding commu-
nity standards); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482–84 (1962) (finding
that if the intended audience is gay men, then the material is not per se prurient).
89. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (describing a “legitimate
state interest . . . in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity,” including “the in-
terest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone
of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself”).
90. Id. at 94–96.
91. Id. at 59–60 (quoting Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 199; Alexander Bickel, On Pornog-
raphy: Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, 22 PUB. INT. 25, 25–26 (Winter 1971))
(regarding “the tone of the society, the mode, or to use terms that have perhaps greater
currency, the style and quality of life, now and in the future”). But see Paris Adult The-
atre I, 413 U.S. at 108–09 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (reminding the majority that “Stanley
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is not absolute.92 The government is limited by, inter alia, constitu-
tional restrictions that operate as a check on the potential of ma-
joritarianism to deny constitutional protection for unpopular speech
and unconventional views.93 To safeguard the speech of minorities
and other marginalized groups, neither popularity nor convention
should be a factor to determine what the First Amendment protects.
Indeed, the First Amendment is most important when it reaches be-
yond convention to protect unpopular or unconventional speech that
expresses positions that push the boundaries of what is considered
acceptable.
The second part of the Miller test adds to Memoirs’ “patently
offensive” the requirement that the offending sexual conduct be
“specifically defined by the applicable state law.”94 The specificity
required under this part is intended to put individuals on notice
about the type of sexually explicit matter that will result in criminal
prosecution.95 If state law is promulgated without procedural irregu-
larities, then it reflects standards embraced by the state as a com-
munity. Consequently, the first part’s “contemporary community
standards” may differ from the specific definition of sexual conduct
found in state law required by the second part.96
The third part of the Miller test rejects both Roth’s “utterly with-
out redeeming social value” and Memoirs’ “utterly without redeem-
ing social value.”97 It defines value in terms of “serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value” which is, in fact, universal.98
The local and state particularities that are relevant to the first and
second parts of Miller are largely irrelevant to the third part.99 This
universality, however, is not a guaranteed bulwark against
majoritarianism. Indeed, the third part of Miller will not necessarily
[sic] . . . rejected as ‘wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment,’
the notion that there is a legitimate state concern in the ‘control (of) the moral content
of a person’s thoughts,’ and we held that a State ‘cannot constitutionally premise legis-
lation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.’ That is not to say,
of course, that a State must remain utterly indifferent to—and take no action bearing
on—the morality of the community. The traditional description of state police power does
embrace the regulation of morals as well as the health, safety, and general welfare of the
citizenry”) (citations omitted).
92. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 61.
93. Id. at 63–64.
94. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see Book Named “John Cleland’s Mem-
oirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418–20 (1966).
95. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 24–25; see Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418–20; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957).
98. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24–26.
99. Id. at 30–34.
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prevent those who are inclined to substitute their values for what
the test requires.100 Nevertheless, basing the third part of the Miller
test on a universal understanding of value provides some protection
against the parochialism that could skew the application of Miller’s
first two parts against the alleged obscenity under review.101
B. LaRue—Nude Dancing ? Liquor
Although California v. LaRue involved sexually explicit adult
entertainment and the First Amendment, it did not involve obscen-
ity.102 Rather, the central question in LaRue was whether California
could regulate nude dancing in public accommodations based, in part,
on the power to regulate liquor sales and licenses under both federal
and state law.103 The Court found the combination of the Tenth and
Twenty-First Amendments, as well as the California State Constitu-
tion, imbued the state with a “super police power” that outweighed
any asserted First Amendment rights.104 Specifically, government
regulations that ban “lewd or naked dancing” in public accommoda-
tions licensed by the state to sell liquor by the drink should not be
“limited to . . . decisions as to obscenity, or . . . some forms of commu-
nicative conduct . . . .”105 In this case, the state’s expressed intention to
regulate in this way because it disagreed with the constitutional
protection afforded stripping was not constitutionally fatal.106
100. Id. at 24, 26.
101. Id. at 24–25.
102. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116 (1972), abrogated by 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
103. Id. at 114.
104. Id. at 118–19.
The Twenty-first Amendment . . . does not qualify the First Amendment’s
prohibition against laws abridging the freedom of speech. Although the
Twenty-first Amendment . . . limits the dormant Commerce Clause’s effect
on a State’s regulatory power over the delivery or use of liquor within its
borders, the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obliga-
tions under other constitutional provisions.
44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 484; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the
Eighteenth Amendment and returning the power to regulate the sale and consumption
of alcohol to the states); CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 (recognizing California’s “exclusive
right and power to license and regulate the manufacture, sale, purchase, possession, and
transportation of alcoholic beverages within the State . . .”).
105. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 116.
106. At trial, the District Court made the following observation:
[L]aw enforcement agencies were upset with the decisions of the United
States and California Supreme Courts in the field of obscenity. In May of
1970, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control began hearings on the
Rules which are the subject of this litigation. Law enforcement agencies,
counsel and owners of licensed premises and investigators for the Depart-
ment testified. The story that unfolded was a sordid one, primarily relating
to sexual conduct between dancers and customers. It is obvious, after reading
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Twenty-three years would pass before the Court repudiated this view
of state power, alcohol, and strip clubs.107 By that time, however, both
the facts and dicta set forth in LaRue gained traction in the regula-
tion of indecency.108
III. DISTINGUISHING OBSCENITY FROM INDECENCY: EXPRESSIVE
CONDUCT, EROTIC MESSAGES, AND SECONDARY EFFECTS
Three lines of cases about sex and speech emerge at the end of
the Court’s 1972 term.109 The first line of cases involves obscenity and
Miller.110 The second line of cases involves indecent nude dancing,
liquor, and LaRue.111 The third line of cases is governed by neither
LaRue because there is no liquor, nor Miller because the speech is
not obscene.112 The Court bridges this doctrinal chasm by building
a new rule with dicta from both Miller and the other obscenity cases
and LaRue.113 This new rule, the Secondary Effects Doctrine, allows
state and local governments to regulate public accommodations that
feature sexually explicit indecent speech.114
the transcripts, that this is why the Department adopted the Rule which
requires certain entertainers to perform on a stage at least six feet away
from any customer. It is also obvious why the plaintiffs have abandoned their
objection to that Rule. No reasonable person could claim that entertainers
and customers have a constitutional right to engage in such conduct in a
cocktail lounge.
However, a fair reading of the transcripts of the hearings requires the con-
clusion that the Department not only desired to prohibit sexual conduct
between dancers and customers, but wanted to establish a set of rules which
would circumvent United States and California Supreme Court decisions
relating to obscenity . . . . It must be stated initially, that displeasure by law
enforcement agencies and state administrative agencies with court decisions
interpreting the scope of the First Amendment cannot provide the basis for
those agencies to adopt rules against entertainment which is protected by
those decisions.
LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348, 352–53 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
107. See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
108. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 116. But see id. at 123 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
“[n]othing in the language or history of the Twenty-first Amendment authorizes the
States to use their liquor licensing power as a means for the deliberate inhibition of
protected, even if distasteful, forms of expression”); id. at 125 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “[a]lthough the State’s broad power to regulate the distribution of liquor
and to enforce health and safety regulations is not to be doubted, that power may not be
exercised in a manner that broadly stifles First Amendment freedoms”).
109. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
110. Supra Section II.A.
111. Supra Section II.B.
112. See Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
113. Infra notes 114–25 and accompanying text.
114. See Britt Cramer, Zoning Adult Businesses: Evaluating the Secondary Effects
Doctrine, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 577, 579 (2014).
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Initially, secondary effects focused on zoning ordinances that
limited where public accommodations featuring commercialized in-
decency could do business.115 The combination of First and Fifth
Amendment rights asserted by the proprietors of these businesses
supported a rule according to which zoning where they could operate
was constitutional only if “[t]he purpose and effect of [the] ordinance
[was] to reduce secondary effects and not to reduce speech.”116 In
most cases, this impact is measured in terms of the degree to which
the regulation affects the market supply of sexually explicit speech.117
While ordinances that incidentally burdened sexually explicit speech
were constitutional, those that appreciably reduced the supply of that
speech were not.118 In these cases, the Court was obliged to uphold
regulations that “decrease the crime and blight associated with cer-
tain speech by the traditional exercise of its zoning power, and at
the same time leave the quantity and accessibility of the speech
substantially undiminished.”119 All but one of the challenged zoning
ordinances reviewed by the Supreme Court during this period passed
this test.120
115. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986); Young v. Am.
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976); see also City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 441–42 (2002).
116. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 445. This is “a built-in legitimate rationale, which
rebuts the usual presumption that content-based restrictions are unconstitutional.” Id.
at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Additional evidence that the zoning ordinances target
the non-speech secondary effects of the sexually explicit indecent speech rather than the
speech itself is found in concurring opinions in the secondary effects cases that advance
analyses rooted in the Fifth Amendment rather than the First Amendment. These con-
curring opinions are written by justices who see no significant First Amendment issues
in the secondary effects cases for different reasons. See Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S.
at 443; Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 55; Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. at 73.
Some believe that infringing on the property rights of those who own the regulated
public accommodations do not involve speech because the theater owners are neither
creators who speak nor the intended audiences for the speech. See, e.g., Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. at 55 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (zoning ordinance as implicating theater
owners and operators’ Fifth Amendment rights); Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 79
n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (characterizing the businesses as “commercial purveyor[s]”
of materials protected by the First Amendment and the ordinance is “an example of in-
novative land-use regulation, implicating First Amendment concerns only incidentally
and to a limited extent”).
117. See Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 452 (2002).
118. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71–72 (1981) (reading Young
as not allowing state and local governments to “ban all adult theaters—much less all live
entertainment or all nude dancing—from its commercial districts citywide”); Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 78–81 (Powell, J., concurring) (using the language of incidental
burden to describe the limits of state and local government power to using zoning ordi-
nances to restrict where adult movie theaters could be located); see also Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. at 445.
119. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 445 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Compare Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. at 51–52, and Am. Mini Theatres, Inc.,
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With Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. and City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
the Secondary Effects Doctrine turns inward to enforce public nudity
laws inside strip clubs to ban nude dancing.121 Both the focus of the
cases, as well as the time during which they are decided, coincide
with the Broward County Sheriff’s unsuccessful crusade to have “As
Nasty As We Wanna Be” declared obscene.122 All three cases repre-
sent state and local efforts to minimize the influence of strip clubs,
music, and strippers on public decency, social order, and morality.123
When obscenity proved unable to give state and local government the
power to ban 2 Live Crews’ music, secondary effects became an al-
ternate path to reach strippers and strip clubs.124 Despite the shared
messages and attendant stigma of both the stripping and the music,
the strippers’ speech is less protected than either strip clubs subject
to zoning ordinances or the music associated with both the clubs and
the stripping.125
What follows is a discussion of three problems with the Secondary
Effects Doctrine in zoning and stripping cases. In the zoning cases,
the Secondary Effects Doctrine: (a) relies on the fiction of content-
neutrality to justify using an intermediate rather than strict standard
of review; (b) allows state and local governments to regulate sexually
explicit indecent speech because they find little or no value in the
speech; and (c) employs evidentiary presumptions that, over time,
make it easier for governments to prove commercialized indecent
speech comes with negative secondary effects and more difficult for
proprietors and dancers to rebut the government’s presumption.126
When the doctrine turns from zoning to stripping, it presents an
opportunity to regulate stripping based on judgments about not only
the value of stripping and strip culture as a function of both race
and sex, but also the particular threat strippers pose to social order,
public morality, and decency.127 Blackness is criminalized in rhetoric
427 U.S. at 72, with Schad, 452 U.S. at 76–77; see also Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at
442–43.
121. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570–72 (1991).
122. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (1992); see Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at
277, 296; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560, 570–72.
123. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 277, 296; Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d 134; Barnes,
501 U.S. at 560, 570–72.
124. See Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d 134.
125. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), with Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at
277, 296, Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 134, and Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560, 570–72.
126. Infra Sections III.A–C. See generally Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 277, 296; Barnes,
501 U.S. at 560, 570–72; Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d 134.
127. The plurality opinions in both Barnes and Pap’s A.M. identify the governments’
interest in social order and morality as substantially unrelated to the speech within the
2019] STRIPPED: SPEECH, SEX, RACE, AND SECONDARY EFFECTS 23
that features some of the more popular characters in narratives
often told about ghetto life.128 According to this “ghetto” trope, Black
super predators, dope boys, and teenage mothers are raised in fam-
ilies headed by single mothers and absent fathers that fail to accul-
turate properly their members in the ways of the dominant society.129
This is the backdrop against which Luke Records, Barnes and Pap’s
meaning of O’Brien. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 277, 302; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560, 585; see
Santiago Legarre & Gregory J. Mitchell, Secondary Effects and Public Morality, 40
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 321–22 (2017) (discussing Barnes, Pap’s A.M., and Alameda
Books, Inc. as “three cases [with] twelve opinions authored by seven different Justices
[that] brought into focus an unresolved tension surrounding the legitimacy of morality
as a basis for lawmaking.” The authors’ ultimate conclusion is that public morality is an
illegitimate basis for legislation purportedly targeting secondary effects, i.e., not a substan-
tial government interest unrelated to suppression of speech); see also Gregory S. Voshell,
Bachelor Parties Beware: The Third Circuit Grapples with Alcohol, Strip Clubs and the
Constitutionality of Morality Legislation, 52 VILL. L. REV. 1095, 1105–11 (2007) (surveying
Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that follow City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.).
But see Barnes, 501 U.S. at 585 (Souter, J., concurring/dissenting) (identifying non-speech
related secondary effects as crime). See generally Jasper Scherer, Fla. ‘Loud Music’
Murder: Firing Into Car Full of Teens Playing Rap Music is Not ‘Self-Defense,’ Court Rules,
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/20
16/11/18/fla-loud-music-murder-firing-into-car-full-of-teens-playing-rap-music-not-self
-defense-court-rules/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/E4TU-8UWZ]; Michael Walsh,
Florida Man Gets Life in Prison for Killing Teen Over Loud Music, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Oct. 17, 2014, 7:21 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/florida-man-life-prison
-killing-teen-loud-music-article-1.1978021 [https://perma.cc/WH3G-V479] (In November
2012, Jordan Davis was fatally shot by a white man at a Jacksonville, Florida gas station
because the shooter “hate[d] [the] thug music” Davis was playing in his car, and Davis
did not comply with the white man’s demand that the car’s occupants turn the music down.
Ironically, the song that triggered the shooting was Beef by Lil Reese, Lil Durk, and
Fredo Santana. After two trials, the white man was convicted of first-degree murder);
Janice Williams, What Donald Trump Said About the Central Park Five Will Be High-
lighted in Netflix’s “When They See Us,” NEWSWEEK (May 28, 2019, 4:06 PM), https://www
.newsweek.com/when-they-see-us-netflix-what-donald-trump-said-1437534 [https://
perma.cc/M86N-YTV5] (the five teens were between 14 and 16 years old. During the
trial, Trump ran ads in the New York Times, the Daily News, the New York Post, and
Newsday in which he urged, “Bring Back the Death Penalty. Bring Back Our Police”);
Karen Zraick, An Arizona Teenager Was Fatally Stabbed. The Suspect Blames Rap Music,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/us/elijah-al-amin-michael
-paul-adams.html [https://perma.cc/6C27-55LK] (17-year-old Elijah Al-Amin was stabbed
twice from the back and had his throat cut by a white man who claimed “the rap music
[Al-Amin] was listening to made him feel ‘unsafe’ ”).
128. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
129. See Anne Hendrixson, Superpredator Meets Teenage Mom: Exploding the Myth
of Out-of-Control Youth, in POLICING THE NATIONAL BODY: SEX, RACE, AND CRIMINALIZATION
231, 232 (Jael Silliman & Anannya Bhattachearjee, eds., 2002); Lisa A. Crooms, The
Mythical, Magical “Underclass”: Constructing Poverty in Race and Gender, Making the
Public Private and the Private Public, 5 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 87, 89–90 (2001);
Rachel Leah, The “Ssuperpredator” Myth Was Discredited, but It Continues to Ruin Young
Black Lives, SALON (April 21, 2018, 11:30 PM), https://www.salon.com/2018/04/21/the
-superpredator-myth-was-discredited-but-it-continues-to-ruin-young-black-lives [https://
perma.cc/GAF7-VYBN]. See generally id.
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A.M. should be read. This context helps to clarify how the Eleventh
Circuit found the trial court judge’s racialized judgment insufficient
to criminalize “As Nasty As They Wanna Be” as obscene.130 Indeed,
the trial court’s conclusion that the album both was obscene and had
a modicum of cultural or artistic value was the same type of value
judgment about Black popular culture the Eleventh Circuit’s opin-
ion fails to give credence in its assessment of “As Nasty As They
Wanna Be” as obscene within the meaning of Miller.131 To uphold
the enforcement of public nudity laws inside strip clubs, the Court
by-passes the Miller obscenity inquiry and instead uses secondary
effects.132 Consequently, the music appears to be more protected
than the stripping even though both are cultural representations
that communicate essentially the same message, albeit from different
perspectives.133 The Court’s approach to these cases works in favor
of the music in which men overwhelmingly represent the artists who
speak about women and against the stripping by which women di-
rectly speak.134 The strip clubs associated with the music feature
female dancers whose speech is devalued and assessed with a version
130. Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 136.
131. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 291; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571.
132. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 291.
133. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), with Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S.
at 296, Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 138–39, and Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570–72.
134. Although this analysis assumes the music is predominated by male voices, it is
not meant to suggest that women’s voices are completely absent from the music. See, e.g.,
Patricia Hill Collins, Is the Personal Still Political?: The Women’s Movement, Feminism,
and Black Women in the Hip-Hop Generation, in FROM BLACK POWER TO HIP HOP:
RACISM, NATIONALISM, AND FEMINISM 161–96 (2006); Nancy Guevara, Women Writin’
Rappin’ Breakin’, in DROPPING SCIENCE: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RAP MUSIC AND HIP HOP
CULTURE 49–51 (William Eric Perkins ed., 1996); JOAN MORGAN, WHEN CHICKENHEADS
COME HOME TO ROOST: MY LIFE AS A HIP HOP FEMINIST (1999); Imani Perry, The Venus
Hip Hop and the Pink Ghetto: Negotiating Spaces for Women, in PROPHETS OF THE HOOD:
POLITICS AND POETICS IN HIP HOP 156–90 (2004); GWENDOLYN D. POUGH, CHECK IT WHILE
I WRECK IT: BLACK WOMANHOOD, HIP-HOP CULTURE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2004);
Tricia Rose, Hidden Politics: Discursive and Institutional Policing of Rap Music, in DROP-
PIN SCIENCE CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RAP MUSIC AND HIP HOP CULTURE 236–57 (William Eric
Perkins ed., 1996); see also John Blistein, Cardi B Slams Jermaine Dupri’s Comments
That All Female Rappers Rap About Stripping, ROLLING STONE (July 12, 2019), https://
www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/cardi-b-jermaine-dupris-female-rappers-re
sponse-858199 [https://perma.cc/T3T2-TDE6]; Joshua Espinoza, Jermaine Dupri Suggests
Strippers-Turned-Rappers Should Start a New Genre, COMPLEX (July 27, 2019), https://
www.complex.com/music/2019/07/jermaine-dupri-says-rapping-strippers-should-start
-genre [https://perma.cc/4Y38-YGTD] (Jermaine Dupri recently said that the music by
former strippers should be called “Strap” music. “I’m telling you. Like, for real. I think
just like we have trap [music], they should call it strap. It’s the stories of their life [. . .]”);
Adrienne Green, What It’s Like to Work as an Exotic Dancer, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 19,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/exotic-dancer/504680 [https://
perma.cc/V2N2-VCE9] (describing clubs where “[a]ll of the dancers are women [and] DJ’s
and managers for the most part are men”).
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of the secondary effects test that is less demanding than the varia-
tion used for zoning ordinances.135 Consequently, the doctrine is more
problematic in cases focused on strippers’ speech than it is in cases
focused on where strip clubs can do business. The specific problems
that arise in the stripping cases are that the doctrine: (a) allows
speech to be banned without requiring state and local governments
either to employ less restrictive means to address the negative sec-
ondary effects of stripping or to demonstrate that extant but unen-
forced zoning ordinances would not effectively address the asserted
secondary effects of the strip clubs; (b) disaggregates nudity from
the speech of dancing despite the fact that nudity is an essential
element of the dancer’s message; and (c) relies on evidentiary pre-
sumptions that render stripping a universal threat to social order,
decency, and morality.136
A. Content-Neutrality
The Court developed the Secondary Effects Doctrine to use ex-
clusively in cases involving indecent sexually explicit speech in public
accommodations.137 The First Amendment’s rules regarding content-
neutrality did not prevent the Court in American Mini Theatres, Inc.
from “hold[ing] that the state may legitimately use the content of
these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classifi-
cation from other motion pictures.”138 The Court calls the doctrine
content-neutral because distinguishing between regular movie the-
aters and those that screened films with indecent sexual content
was “justified by the city’s interest in preserving the character of its
neighborhoods.”139 This is the genesis of the fiction that allows an
ordinance purportedly aimed at sexually explicit indecent speech to
“be upheld so long as the . . . ordinance [is] designed to serve a sub-
stantial government interest [unrelated to the content of the speech]
and that reasonable alternative avenues of communication remained
available.”140 The kinds of substantial government interest the Court
135. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
136. See generally Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986); Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
137. John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 293
(2009).
138. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 70–71.
139. Id. at 71. Content-neutrality results in scrutiny that focuses on the “incidental
burden” of Detroit’s zoning ordinance.
140. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 434 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986)).
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has found to be unrelated to suppressing speech include decreased
property values, as well as crime and general lawlessness.141 It is more
accurate, however, to acknowledge that the doctrine “occupies a kind
of limbo between full-blown content-based restrictions and regula-
tions that apply without any reference to the substance of what is
said.”142 This would appear to make the test either content-correla-
tive or content-driven. It would not, however, be content-neutral.
More troubling than the fiction of content-neutrality is the fact
that the doctrine permits the regulation of “speech reflecting a
favorable view of being explicit about sex and a favorable view of the
practices it depicts . . . .”143 Indeed, “[t]he more precisely the content is
identified, the greater is the opportunity for government censorship”
of a particular viewpoint.144 The Court has found this type of view-
point-based restriction to be per se unconstitutional in cases where
state and local governments have enacted hate speech ordinances.145
Here, however, sexually explicit speech expressing a sex-positive
view can be targeted without contravening the First Amendment’s
prohibition on viewpoint-based regulation.146
When we turn to public nudity laws, it appears that the justifica-
tions proffered under the guise of the secondary effects test have
even more difficulty meeting the definition of content-neutrality
141. This is the result under the Time, Place and Manner (TPM) test of either United
States v. O’Brien or Ward v. Rock Against Racism. See 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989); 391 U.S.
367, 376–80 (1968). Under these tests, constitutional regulations must either prohibit
no more speech than is essential to further the important or substantial content-neutral
government interest or be narrowly tailored enough to allow alternative methods to com-
municate the message. Id. For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the
substantial government interests furthered by Detroit’s Anti-Skidrow Ordinance included
preventing an “undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property
values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and
businesses to move elsewhere.” 427 U.S. at 55.
142. Alameda Books Inc., 535 U.S. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Clay Calvert
& Robert D. Richards, Stripping Away First Amendment Rights: The Legislative Assault
on Sexually Oriented Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 287, 321 (2004) (“The
secondary effects doctrine gave . . . communities a tool to avoid justifying what otherwise
would have been content-based restrictions to strict judicial scrutiny.”).
143. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 457.
144. Id.
145. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992). Content-based
restrictions are presumptively invalid unless the speech is “of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.” Id. at 382–83 (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (regarding fighting words but this is a function of
whether speech is protected rather than the treatment afforded protected speech). The
parallel here would be obscenity versus indecency where the former can be regulated
based on its content because it is unprotected by the First Amendment, and the latter
is protected and cannot be regulated because of its content.
146. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387–90 (holding viewpoint-based discrimination is per se
unconstitutional).
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than the zoning ordinances discussed previously.147 In the nude danc-
ing cases, the Secondary Effects Doctrine allows the government to
use generally applicable public nudity laws to ban nude dancing be-
cause the bans only incidentally burden the strippers’ erotic mes-
sage.148 If nude dancing is banned, the Court opines, then a partially
clad dancer has “ample capacity to convey [her] erotic [albeit muted]
message.”149 From the Court’s perspective, clothing imperceptibly
changes the dancing communicates to the dancer’s intended audience.
This approach would appear to target the speech’s primary effects
because it analyzes the law’s impact on how the message is under-
stood rather than what the speaker intends to say.150 In addition, it
147. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560 (1991).
148. According to the Court, enforcing a generally applicable public nudity law in a
strip club is content-neutral because the law bans public nudity regardless of its location.
It does not single out strip clubs for regulation. Under these circumstances, the regulation
will be upheld because its impact on First Amendment rights is incidental. See Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. 277; Barnes, 501 U.S. 560; see also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc, 427 U.S.
50, 71–73 (1976) (assessing the constitutionality of Detroit’s Anti-Skidrow Ordinance based
on its “incidental burden” on First Amendment speech). But see Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 324
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (advancing an analysis that preserves strippers’ First Amendment
rights and criticizing the plurality in Pap’s A.M. for not only “mistaken[ly] . . . equating our
secondary effects cases with the ‘incidental burdens’ doctrine applied in cases such as
O’Brien,” but also “aggravat[ing] the error by invoking the latter line of cases to support
its assertion that Erie’s ordinance is unrelated to speech”). Stevens notes that “[t]he in-
cidental burdens doctrine applies when ‘ “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined
in the same course of conduct,’ and the government’s interest in regulating the latter
justifies incidental burdens on the former . . . . Secondary effects . . . are indirect conse-
quences of protected speech and may justify regulation of the places where that speech
may occur.” Id. Stevens found it “strange” that Erie’s alleged concern with the effects of
the message that were unrelated to the message itself was combatted by means that re-
quired, in fact, “the suppression of the message.” Id. at 325. This, in Stevens’ opinion,
was a case of the plurality wanting to “have its cake and eat it too . . . .” Id. at 326. Stevens
sees Erie’s choice as either the “ordinance was not aimed at speech and the plurality may
attempt to justify the regulation under the incidental burdens test, or Erie has aimed
its law at the secondary effects of speech, and the plurality can try to justify the law under
that doctrine. But it cannot conflate the two with the expectation that Erie’s interests
aimed at secondary effects will be rendered unrelated to speech by virtue of this doc-
trinal polyglot.” Id.
149. Id. at 301; see also id. at 307–08 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (contending
that the ordinance regulates conduct regardless of any intention to communicate a
message. As such, there are no First Amendment issues here. “In Barnes, I voted to
uphold the challenged Indiana statute ‘not because it survives some lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny, but because, as a general law regulating conduct and not specifically
directed at expression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all’ ”).
150. Id. at 294–95; see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 294 (requiring pasties and G strings
“mut[es] message” and does not silence the dancers); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 468 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1984) (concluding proposed protest against homelessness does
not require the National Park Service to issue a permit to allow homeless people and
their allies to set up an encampment on the National Mall where the generally applicable
rule for permits does not allow this kind of protest and there is insufficient evidence that
the Park Services’ denial was motivated by its disapproval of or disagreement with the
message of the protestors).
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disregards the symbiosis of speech between dancers and patrons by
failing to analyze the impact of the ban on the messages the dancers
intend to convey, and, instead, focusing on how those messages are
understood.151
In addition, the Court suspends the market-based analysis it
used in the earlier zoning cases, only to resurrect it in City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., which is decided after Barnes and
Pap’s A.M.152 Both Barnes and Pap’s A.M. uphold public nudity laws
that ban nude dancing not based on the way they irreparably alter the
market for sexually explicit speech but rather because they inciden-
tally burden the erotic message understood by the dancer’s intended
audience.153 By the time the Court decides City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc., the Court upholds a municipal zoning ordinance
despite the fact that effectively decreases the supply of sexually ex-
plicit indecent speech by half.154 This result seems possible only
because of the analysis deployed in the two stripping/public nudity
cases. The relaxed standard that emerges from Barnes and Pap’s
A.M. permits zoning regulations to pass constitutional muster that
would have been unconstitutional before Barnes.155
The indecency of the speakers, their audiences, and those who
own the public accommodations in which the indecency is sold
threaten public health, safety, welfare, and morality of the commu-
nities in which they transact business. This analysis positions the
strippers outside the public, thereby rendering a threat to be thwarted
rather than part of the public whose interests should be protected.
Positioned in this way, the dancers’ speech is stripped of any legiti-
macy as a means of “informal politics.”156 This complicates public
membership as well as whose and what rights are legitimately part
of the “public” in whose interest the state acts.157 If strippers are part
of the public, then they have a “right . . . to participate in the speech
by which we govern ourselves.”158 In this way, their speech is “a means
of informal politics.”159 The Secondary Effects Doctrine, however,
excludes not only strippers from the public, but also their First
151. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 323.
152. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 436 (2002).
153. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 301–02; Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
570–72 (1991).
154. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 301–02; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571–72.
156. James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex, and the First Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 695, 865–67, 881 (2007).
157. Dana Meepos, The Purgatory of Pole Dancing, 19 U.C.L.A. WOMEN’S L.J. 213,
231–41 (2012) (examining secondary effects’ exclusion of strippers from public and casting
women as threats to public health, safety, and welfare).
158. Weinstein, supra note 156, at 877.
159. Id. at 881.
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Amendment speech rights from the legitimate public interest state
and local governments can act to further.160 Strippers are denied “a
fair opportunity” to use their speech “to influence the sexual mores
of the society.”161 Consequently, the actors most vulnerable to exploi-
tation in transactions involving commercialized sexually explicit in-
decency are either criminalized or robbed of their agency by analyses
that make choosing either to speak or to listen to indecent speech an
illegitimate choice.162 This appears to be for no other reason than the
disapproval of those who make and enforce the law.163
The gendered impact of the secondary effects analysis means
that dancers, most of whom are women, are stripped of the follow-
ing: (1) their agency; (2) their voices; (3) their right to contribute to
public discourse through informal politics; and (4) their membership
in the public.164 The music and the artists who create it are not simi-
larly stripped. The music allows them to operate politically because
the music is not obscene.165 This is one of the reasons why formal
160. Alemzadeh, supra note 35, at 343.
161. Weinstein, supra note 156, at 878 (discussing “informal politics” and the role sex-
ually explicit speech can play in such informal politics). Although Weinstein’s analysis
is limited to the obscenity doctrine for hardcore pornography, it is equally relevant to the
Secondary Effects Doctrine and indecency. Indeed, when applied to stripping and secondary
effects, the women’s speech is directly implicated and their First Amendment speech
rights include, e.g., “the right of each individual to participate in the speech by which we
govern ourselves.” Id. at 880–82.
162. Alemzadeh, supra note 35, at 339 (discussing the discriminatory impact of both
labor laws and secondary effects on strippers and their exclusion from the public because
they are constructed as a threat); see, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (holding Indianapolis’ Anti-Pornography
Civil Rights Ordinance as unconstitutional); CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM & POR-
NOGRAPHY (Drucilla Cornell, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000); CATHERINE MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE & LAW (Harvard Univ. Press 1988); Elaine
Blair, Fighting for Her Life, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 27, 2019), https://www.nybooks.com
/articles/2019/06/27/andrea-dworkin-fighting-for-her-life [https://perma.cc/TFY7-28V4];
Molly Crabapple, It’s Not About Sex, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 23, 2019), https://www.ny
books.com/articles/2019/05/23/not-about-sex [https://perma.cc/S5KB-SJK5] (noting “[l]ike
so many issues involving women, debates about sex work are often bogged down in the
question of whether sex work itself is ‘degrading’ or ‘empowering’ . . . . The question ‘Is
sex work good?’ has little to do with ‘Should sex workers have rights?’ . . . ‘Sex workers
are associated with sex, and to be associated with sex is to be dismissible . . . .’ ”); see also
Rob Kuznia, Among Some Hate Groups, Porn Is Viewed as a Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/us/hate-groups-porn-conspiracy.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/FY6E-D7US] (discussing white supremacist nationalists who blame
Jews and the porn industry for attempting “to control [the] sexuality” and reproduction
of white men who consume pornography including a Reddit group called “The Proud
Boys” who encourage members and allies to kick the pornography habit in the interest
of their white supremacist goals and objectives).
163. See Alemzadeh, supra note 35, at 370.
164. See id. at 372.
165. Art Harris, Not Quite As Nasty As They Wanna Be, WASH. POST (June 16, 1990),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1990/06/16/not-quite-as-nasty-as-they
-wanna-be/edcb167d-a3e3-4ee6-8713-b185b783cd66 [https://perma.cc/47SM-WFRG].
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political attempts to censor it have failed.166 This also reinforces the
strippers’ collective status, vis-à-vis those who make the music to
which the strippers dance, employ them in the clubs in which they
dance, or consume the strippers’ speech as their intended audiences.167
The strippers are cast as women who service patriarchy and its in-
terests, thereby making them instrumentally important to advance
the constitutional rights of both property owners and musicians.
The Secondary Effects Doctrine targets stripping without making it
important either to hear the women’s voices or to protect their rights
to speak.
Among the things that are sacrificed by this stingy view of public
interests and secondary effects is the possibility of the First Amend-
ment rights of dancers as content creators.168 These are interests
that state and local governments should be required to protect.169
The dancers’ speech is a legitimate part of public discourse and, as
such, should be protected from content-driven regulations that do
not meet the strict scrutiny the First Amendment would otherwise
trigger. The genesis of the Secondary Effects Doctrine in zoning cases
grants proprietors First Amendment rights because of the First
Amendment activity featured in the adult entertainment establish-
ments the zoning ordinances seek to regulate.170 This, however,
seems to be a questionable basis for extending First Amendment
rights and protections beyond the primary rights holders to those
whose connection to the First Amendment is, at best, ancillary rather
than primary. The problems associated with this shift in the zoning
cases are exacerbated when the analysis is extended to nude danc-
ing.171 When used to ban nude dancing inside the strip club, the
Secondary Effects Doctrine obscures the symbiosis of speech and
rights between the dancers and patrons that the First Amendment
is supposed to protect.172 The property owners are involved only
because the adult entertainment businesses they own and operate
166. See also Hunter Schwarz, 25 Years Ago, 2 Live Crew Were Arrested for Obscenity.
Here’s the Fascinating Backstory, WASH. POST (June 11, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/11/25-years-ago-2-live-crew-were-arrested-for-obscenity
-heres-the-fascinating-back-story [https://perma.cc/MF3D-R6E9]. Compare Harris, supra
note 165, with Jonathan Yardley, Art and the Ouevre of 2 Live Crew, WASH. POST (Oct. 22,
1990), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1990/10/22/art-and-the-oeuvre
-of-2-live-crew/7edd8e65-33c0-4577-b42e-ecb547209ff8 [https://perma.cc/MF3D-R6E9].
167. See Harris, supra note 165.
168. Weinstein, supra note 156, at 884.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 886.
171. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2002).
172. Angela Mae Kupenda, Leslie P. Barry & Mark D. Fijman, A New Standing Re-
quirement for First Amendment Litigants?: Bar Owners Resting on Their Own Bottoms
or Still Resting on the Bare Bottoms of Nude Dancers, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 81, 82 (1998).
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facilitate the exchanges between the primary First Amendment rights
holders, i.e., dancers and patrons.173 Framing the issues raised in
this way reveals that the owners stand outside this First Amend-
ment relationship because their constitutional rights are based on
property rather than the speech transactions that occur on their
property.174 Treating dancers, patrons, and proprietors as if they have
the same rights grants proprietors standing to assert the dancers’
First Amendment claims. This outcome is inconsistent with general
principles regarding third party standing because it relies on the
assumption that the interests of the dancers and the proprietors are
essentially the same.175 Although their interests align because public
nudity laws impact their collective bottom line, the general adver-
sarial nature of the employer/employee relationship would seem to
militate against allowing proprietors to use third party standing to
advance First Amendment claims on behalf of the dancers.176
The Secondary Effects Doctrine, however, obfuscates this differ-
ence by foregrounding the property owners and transforming them
into primary, rather than secondary, First Amendment rightshold-
ers.177 It fails to account for the primacy of the content-creators and
audiences as rightsholders.178 Consequently, the Court strips the
173. Id.
174. This is limited to cases in which proprietors face neither criminal prosecution nor
property seizure. This should not be understood to suggest that there are no circumstances
under which the property owners may properly assert First Amendment claims. Indeed,
property owners’ First Amendment rights are involved when laws threaten either “a
theater owner or a bookseller” with criminal prosecution or censorship. This is because
“certain criminal statutes or censorship or licensing schemes” make it so “only the theater
owner or the bookseller . . . can protect” the First Amendment rights against impermis-
sible government regulation. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976). In
addition, Detroit’s Anti-Skidrow Ordinance did not result in property seizure or abate-
ment. Id. at 54–55. Compare Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1973), with Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (cases in which property owners and es-
tablishment proprietors faced criminal prosecution, fines, and property seizure). Although
these cases turned on the constitutionality of the statutory definition of obscenity, the
penalties faced by the owners and proprietors are analogous to what is not at stake in
the secondary effects cases. Heller, 413 U.S. 483 at 488–89; Paris Adult Theatre I, 413
U.S. at 53–54. At best, these cases present issues of regulatory takings, and the property
owners’ economic harms place them among the “legion that [have] sustained zoning against
claims of serious economic damage.” Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 78 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Cases like this might also present issue of ripeness and the accompanying de-
fense that any claims regarding economic loss may be speculative where the challenged
ordinance has not gone into effect—prophylactic measures and the court not requiring
state and local governments to wait until the secondary effects occur before acting. E.g.,
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986).
175. Kupenda et al., supra note 172, at 95.
176. Id. (questioning First Amendment standing for adult entertainment establishment
owners and proprietors because they neither create nor consume speech sold in the
establishments).
177. See Kupenda et al., supra note 172, at 81.
178. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 78–79 (Powell, J., concurring) (reframing the
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primary rights holders of their First Amendment rights, thereby
rendering the dancers largely irrelevant to the adjudicated cases.179
Upholding public nudity laws based on the relaxed incidental
burdens test relies on an analysis that disaggregates the message
and the dancer’s nudity. While the erotic message is protected, nudity
is cast as conduct that is inessential to the erotic message as either
communicated by the stripper or understood by the stripper’s in-
tended audience.180 This approach, however, denies the fundamental
fact “that nude dancing is a species of expressive conduct that is
protected by the First Amendment.”181 Within this context, public
nudity laws that ban nude dancing inside strip clubs take aim at
nudity which “is both a component of the protected expression and
the specific target of the ordinance.”182 Therefore, “[t]he nudity
element of nude dancing performances cannot be neatly pigeonholed
as mere ‘conduct’ independent of any expressive component of the
dances.”183 The “pure sophistry” on which the Secondary Effects Doc-
trine relies ignores the reality that nude dancing is targeted “pre-
cisely because of its communicative attributes.”184 It is also based on
the assumption “that one can separate advocacy from the act itself,
even though the act contains an element of advocacy.”185
Secondary effects’ intermediate scrutiny translates into more
judicial deference to state and local governments than is given under
Miller’s obscenity test, the strict scrutiny, triggered by content-based
regulations, as well as either time, place and manner or O’Brien as
used in cases involving content-neutral regulations.186 This is at the
inquiry in American Mini-Theatres, Inc. as follows: “(i) Does the ordinance impose any
content limitation on the creators of adult movies or their ability to make them available
to whom they desire, and (ii) does it restrict in any significant way the viewing of these
movies by those who desire to see them?”). According to Justice Powell,
the impact of the ordinance on these interests is incidental and minimal.
Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship, and has imposed
no limitation upon those who wish to view them. The ordinance is addressed
only to the places at which this type of expression may be presented, a re-
striction that does not interfere with content. Nor is there any significant
overall curtailment of adult movie presentations, or the opportunity for a
message reach an audience.
Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 78–81.
181. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 326 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 326.
183. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 592–93 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
184. Pap’s A.M., 501 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, Justice dissenting) (emphasis in original).
185. Weinstein, supra note 156, at 882.
186. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1982); Ward v. Rock
against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The
Court has developed two ways to assess the constitutionality of content-neutral laws and
regulations. First, Time, Place and Manner (TPM) regulations are content-neutral and
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expense of the First Amendment rights of the dancers and the pa-
trons.187 By the time the Court reviews the constitutionality of public
nudity laws, the market-based assessment from the zoning cases
seems to have fallen out of favor.188 The Court’s own precedent would
seem to suggest two things. First, these cases treat the speakers’ in-
tended messages as a secondary rather than a primary concern.189
Second, it does so based on concerns about the primary rather than
secondary effects of the dancers’ speech on the clubs’ patrons.190
B. Value
The Miller test prevents speech from being adjudged obscene
merely because the trier of facts views the speech as having no
value.191 Indecency, however, is less protected than non-sexual
speech based on the very type of value judgments Miller prevents
from overdetermining whether sexual speech is obscene.192 The Sec-
ondary Effects Doctrine exists, in large part, because of the difficulty
of meeting the high standard from Miller, as well as the justice’s
views about the value of the speech.193 For example, in his plurality
opinion in American Mini Theatres, Inc. Justice Stevens makes the
following observation:
narrowly tailored. Clark, 486 U.S. at 293; Ward, 491 U.S. at 794; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at
377. TPM regulations must also serve a significant government interest and leave open
ample alternative channels to communicate the speaker’s message. Id. Second, state and
local governments can regulate indecent symbolic speech or expressive conduct only if
the regulation is within the constitutional power of the government to enact. Clark, 468
U.S. at 299. If this threshold requirement is met, then the regulation is further examined
to determine if it furthers an important or substantial government interest, unrelated
to the suppression of speech, and it prohibits no more speech than is essential to further
the government interest. Clark, 468 U.S. at 295; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. However,
there is some uncertainty about whether these two tests are separate or the same.
187. In these cases, the dancers, not the club owners, are content-creators within the
meaning of the First Amendment.
188. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Erie
v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes, 501 U.S. 560; City of Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
189. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1987) (distinguishing primary from secondary
effects of speech). Compare Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, with Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989) (determining if conduct has enough communicative elements to garner First
Amendment protection, a court must consider if “[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it”).
190. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 291.
191. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that
the record in case was “insufficient . . . for [the] Court to assume the fact finder’s artistic
or literary knowledge or skills to satisfy the last prong of the Miller analysis”).
192. Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 135–36.
193. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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[E]ven though we recognize[d] that the First Amendment will
not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have
some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest
in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate. . .But few of us would march our sons and daughters off
to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see the ‘Specified Sexual
Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.194
Under Stevens’ analysis, the relatively low value of the sexually ex-
plicit speech featured in the zoned movie theaters in Detroit allows
the city to regulate them because of their sexually explicit content
without having to satisfy strict scrutiny.195 While this value judg-
ment can support content-based regulations, it appears that, in the
zoning cases, it cannot support a ban that “total[ly] suppress[ed]”
such speech.196 Stevens’ analysis also assesses the value of sexually
explicit speech vis-à-vis political speech.197 It assumes that sexual
speech and political speech are mutually exclusive. Therefore, sexu-
ally explicit speech is not political and political speech is not sexually
explicit. Used in this way, the First Amendment supports a speech
hierarchy based on two basic assumptions. First, all political speech
is per se high value no matter how crudely that speech is communi-
cated.198 Second, sexually explicit speech is not political regardless
194. 427 U.S. 50, 70–71 (1976) (plurality opinion).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 70.
197. Id. at 70–71. Part III of Stevens’ opinion in American Mini Theatres, Inc. notes
that although sexual explicit indecent speech has “some arguably artistic value, it is mani-
fest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different,
and lesser, magnitude, than the interest in untrammeled political debate.” Id. at 70; see
also Luke Records, Inc., 960 at 137–39 (holding judges lacked competence to make value
judgment about music which led the trial court’s decision to be reversed).
198. If concerns about the impact of some speech on public discourse, social mores, and
morality are legitimate, then those concerns should be legitimate for speech regardless
of its subject matter. Recent events have shown political speech to be crude, vulgar, false,
and discriminatory. Members of the political branches have contributed to the overall
coarsening of public discourse more than indecent speech about sex.
Within the First Amendment, however, sexually explicit speech is never political; hence,
indecent speech is deserving of less protection than political speech. For some, however,
sexually explicit speech is, indeed, political. One example of this are the pro-pornography,
sex-positive feminists who challenged the conservative positions advanced by, inter alia,
radical anti-pornography feminists who opposed pornography because it is inherently
harmful to women and advances a patriarchal and misogynistic agenda. The privileging
of political speech, as well as the devaluation of sexually explicit speech, is a function of
particular views about the purpose and objectives of the First Amendment. Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States is the genesis of the “marketplace
of ideas” metaphor that tends to favor less censorship and more speech. According to
Holmes, speech is instrumental to the search for truth which, under the best circum-
stances, emerges from diverse opinions. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In his
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of the speakers’ intent.199 Consequently, political speech and sexu-
ally explicit speech are mutually exclusive.
Making the relative value of sexual speech a function of either
its similarity to or its difference from political speech not only helps
to stigmatize sexual speech, but also leaves it subject to regulations
that would not pass constitutional muster for virtually any other
type of protected speech.200 Indeed, freed from the constraints of
Miller’s “all or nothing” test, the Secondary Effects Doctrine gives
judges unchecked power to opine about the value of indecent speech
despite its status as constitutionally protected.201 This would seem
to be improper. The value of the speech is relevant to determining
if the speech is protected rather than the extent of the protection
afforded nonobscene speech. Neutralizing the influence of these un-
checked value judgments is particularly important where speech is
view, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.” Id.; see also Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of
Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1–46 (2002). Additional objectives attributed to the First
Amendment are “speech in furtherance of free self-government” and freedom of ex-
pression as necessary to promote individual fulfillment—“when speech is freely chosen
by the speaker to persuade others, it defines and expresses the speaker’s ‘self ’ and
promotes his liberty and ‘self-realization’ by enabling him to develop his powers, abilities
and to make and influence decisions regarding his destiny.” Freedom of Expression—
Speech & Press, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amend
ment-1/freedom-of-expression-speech-and-press#fn410amd1 [https://perma.cc/5BRN
-ZBYN]; see also Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
687–756 (2016) (describing free speech consequentialism as the result of balancing
harms and benefits of speech which is used to divide protected and unprotected speech,
as well as to define those categories of speech).
199. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289. But see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc, 535 U.S. 425, 443–44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding secondary
effects is unnecessary because “[t]he Constitution does not prevent . . . communities that
wish to do so from regulating, or indeed entirely suppressing the business of pandering
sex”). Pander—(n) is one who “caters to the lust of others, a male bawd, a pimp, or a
procurer;” (v) to pimp; to “cater[ ] to the gratification of the lust of another” or to entice
a woman to enter into a place where prostitution is practiced. HASCAL RUSSEL BRILL,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINAL LAW 1661–62 (1923). The use of pandering in this instance
instrumentalizes the women and their speech to support a narrative according to which
they must be protected from (male) panderers.
200. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 70–71 (plurality opinion) (holding sexually
explicit nature of speech permits total suppression because it does not contribute to
“political debate” or discourse). Also, commercial speech, of which stripping is arguably
an example, need only be communicated in ways that do not confuse or mislead the
public. It is worth noting that the case in which the Court repudiated its “super police
powers” analysis from LaRue was a commercial speech case. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. V.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 44 Liquormart not only repudiated this part of LaRue,
but also reversed the Court’s opinion in Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. Morality
and paternalism drove Puerto Rico to ban casino gambling ads in local newspapers and
other periodicals because of Puerto Rico’s concern about the negative effect gambling
would have on Puerto Rico. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 331–33.
The island’s casinos were intended for tourists not locals. Id. at 331–33.
201. See infra Sections III.A and III.B.
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both sexually explicit and unpopular with those either cloaked in
the power of the state or public figures who influence law and policy.
Inside the strip club, the comparison between Miller and sec-
ondary effects is starker. Both the music and the stripping featured
in the strip clubs find themselves within the cross-hairs of those
who seem to see little daylight between the two. The moral crusade
to staunch the growing appeal of and demand for sexually explicit
speech through both music and dance, however, is at odds with those
who find morality too thin a basis for banning either strip clubs or
stripping. Moreover, the Secondary Effects Doctrine works to con-
strain the threat of sexually explicit speech which is made more
credible by the types of race and gender narratives about criminality,
immorality, and indecency that have become so accepted that mu-
nicipalities need only assert the threat to render it credible.202 Ob-
scenity proved unable to justify attempts to criminalize the music.203
Secondary effects, however, allowed governments to ban the strip-
ping that accompanies that music. Based on Luke Records, Inc., one
can safely assume that applying Miller to stripping would have
yielded a different result.204 As was the case with “As Nasty As They
Wanna Be,” it is unlikely that stripping “lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.”205 State and local government discre-
tion to enforce public nudity laws in strip clubs was upheld based on
the Court’s conclusion that the ban’s impact on the erotic speech is
de minimus.206 In these cases, what was originally the impact of the
ban on the market for indecent speech changes to the impact of the
ban on the message understood by the speakers’ intended audience.207
In the end, this appears to be a matter of primary rather than sec-
ondary effects.
Unlike zoning, the view of the low value of stripping as speech can
support banning nude dancing.208 The difference between “the en-
tertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those
who can pay the price” and “the dance viewed by the [man] who . . .
wants some ‘entertainment’ with his beer or shot of rye” should be
202. See Lambros Fatsis, Grime: Criminal Subculture or Public Counterculture? A
Critical Investigation into the Criminalization of Black Musical Subcultures in the U.S.,
15 CRIME, MEDIA, CULTURE 401, 447–48 (2019) (examining the criminalization of Black
musical subgenres as “a persistent feature of ‘policing against black people’ in Britain”).
203. See Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 340 (1992).
204. The results are different because at least the third part of Miller could not be
satisfied. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973). The type of evidence proffered
by Luke Records in its case has increased as hip-hop scholars research and write about
the music and the culture. See Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d at 136.
205. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d 340 (1992).
206. Miller, 413 U.S. at 35.
207. See generally id.
208. See Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560–61 (1991).
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irrelevant to the level of First Amendment protection that speech
enjoys.209 Moreover, the First Amendment should not be used to
reinforce the speakers’ marginalized collective status, vis-à-vis both
those who employ them and those who seek to access their speech.
Perhaps including the speakers within the public in whose interest
state and local government may act would yield a different result.
This shift, however, disrupts the central narratives of threat and
danger around which the non-speech secondary effects are con-
structed. Indeed, a majority of the justices in Barnes and Pap’s A.M.
view the limited protection given stripping as justified by the combi-
nation of the forms of the sexually explicit message and the forum
in which the message is communicated.210 Secondary effects uses
form, i.e., dancing or music, and forum, i.e., public accommodation
or private club or residence, to reinforce the relatively low value of
the stripping or the sexually explicit message conveyed by all man-
ner of adult entertainment.211 The music, however, is different
because it is not obscene. At best, it is ancillary to the secondary
effects analysis of the clubs and stripping because the music is
intertwined with both the message and the venue.212 The interplay
between obscenity and secondary effects allows women to be rele-
gated to functioning as instruments to serve patriarchy and its
interests. The largely male voices in the music are afforded the
highest level of protection from content-based regulation. The estab-
lishment owners and proprietors are also protected based on their
Fifth Amendment property rights which appear to be enhanced by
the First Amendment rights of the dancers and the establishments’
patrons. Both the must and the establishments are represented by
individuals, the vast majority of whom are men who benefit directly
from women’s corporeal speech, which is assessed with a more le-
nient secondary effects test than that used by the Court before Barnes.
It does so at the expense of the women and makes both women’s
rights and voices largely irrelevant to legitimate public discourse.
It does so without making it important either to hear the women’s
voices or to protect their rights to speak.
C. Evidentiary Presumptions
The final reason that the Secondary Effects Doctrine is inade-
quate to protect both strippers’ sexually explicit speech and the clubs
209. Id. (citing Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part sub nom., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)).
210. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 302 (2000); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 586–87.
211. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 302; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 586–87.
212. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584.
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in which they work has to do with evidentiary burdens for both gov-
ernments and those challenging government regulations.213 Initially,
governments proffered evidence of negative secondary effects such
as decreased property values and the overall quality of “urban life”
measured by crime and poverty statistics.214 This type of evidence
proved the government’s interest was not only “substantial” or “sig-
nificant”, but also unrelated to the suppression of speech.215 This
power to zone, however, has to be exercised in a way that “leave[s]
the quantity and accessibility of the speech substantially undimin-
ished.”216 Moreover, municipalities cannot regulate speech because
they either disagree with the speech or disapprove of the message.217
Initially, cities like Detroit and Los Angeles proffered secondary
effects evidence made more credible by widely disseminated and
understood “ghetto” narratives.218 These narratives not only justified
213. See Meepos, supra note 157, at 239.
214. The best evidence of the threats secondary effects pose to the communities in
which adult business operate is direct contemporaneous evidence of reduced property
values and increased crime. In Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc. Detroit’s Anti-Skid Row
ordinance was supported by empirical data on which the City’s Common Council rea-
sonably relied. 427 U.S. 50, 52–55 (1976). See also City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 453–66 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the most direct way
to establish that the ordinance is truly aimed at the secondary effects of the adult en-
tertainment establishments is to provide evidence of “property devaluation and crime”
as the real object of “the regulation.” This can be “show[n] by empirical evidence that the
effects exist, that they are caused by the expressive activity subject to the zoning, and
that the zoning can be expected either to ameliorate them or to enhance the capacity of
the government to combat them . . . without suppressing the expressive activity itself”).
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., NEIGHBORHOODS & VIOLENT CRIME
(Summer 2016), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/summer16/highlight2
.html (highlighting example of the type of data available to state and local governments
to support attempts to regulate the secondary effects of speech).
215. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 49–50, 63 (1986). See also
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying negative externali-
ties as “property devaluation and crime”); Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 48 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (discussing “protec[ting] and preserv[ing] the quality of [Renton’s] neigh-
borhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life”); Am. Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. at 71–72 (discussing “the present and future character of . . . neighborhoods”
and “the quality of urban life”).
216. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 445 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “A zoning law
need not be blind to the secondary effects of adult speech, so long as the purpose of the
law is not to suppress it.” Id. at 447. For this reason, the Borough of Mount Ephraim, New
Jersey claimed its ordinance, which prohibited live dancing in certain commercial zones,
was designed to implement “its plan to create a commercial area that caters only to the
‘immediate needs’ of its residents and that would enable them to purchase at local stores
the few items they occasionally forgot to buy outside the Borough.” Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72 (1981). The Court, however, found “it . . . difficult to rec-
oncile this characterization of the Borough’s commercial zones with the provisions of the
ordinance.” Id. Moreover, Mount Ephraim claimed “ problems . . . such as parking, trash,
police protection, and medical facilities,” justified the ordinance’s ban. Id. at 73–74.
217. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 455 (Souter, J., dissenting).
218. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 442; Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 54–55;
see HERB BOYD, BLACK DETROIT: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2017).
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excessive and violent policing, but also proved the dangers in cities
where Black people occasionally rebelled in full view of television
cameras filming footage for the evening news.219 The best case was
when municipalities proffered contemporaneous evidence of nega-
tive secondary effects specific to the jurisdiction under review. Some
cities were also aided by the Court’s own precedent that documented
how indecency threatened the quality of urban life.220 For Los An-
geles, for example, the relevant narrative also included the facts from
earlier cases, including LaRue, Miller, and Kaplan.221
The Court also found Renton, Washington acted reasonably
when it did not proffer its own evidence but rather relied on Seattle
data and a Washington Supreme Court opinion that recognized the
negative secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments.222
Renton had no choice but to rely on Seattle’s data because Renton
had no direct experience with the adult movie theaters it wanted to
zone.223 Renton’s proximity to Seattle made it reasonable for Renton
to use Seattle’s data rather than generate its own.224 Indeed, rather
than conclude the ordinance was a prior restraint, the Court noted
219. In American Mini Theatres, Inc., for example, the data on which the Detroit
Common Council relied was credible. 427 U.S. at 71. The data undoubtedly quantified
Detroit’s larger ghetto narrative of quintessential urban blight, which, according to the
data was caused by commercial activities including adult entertainment. Id. It did so,
however, based on a view that placed the larger institutional and structural causes of
what the Common Council sought to address outside the reach of the law. Id.; see also
BOYD, supra note 218.
220. See Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 442.
221. See generally GAYE THERESA JOHNSON, SPACES OF CONFLICT, SOUNDS OF SOLIDAR-
ITY: MUSIC, RACE, AND SPATIAL ENTITLEMENT IN LOS ANGELES (2013). Los Angeles “urban
life” narrative is one that not only involves narratives regarding race and sex, but also with
which the Court has a long history. Id. The Court’s 1972 and 1973 terms featured three
California cases in which the constitutionality of sexually explicit speech was at issue.
By 2003, Los Angeles’ “urban life” narrative involved both racial and sexual impropriety.
Id. Like Detroit, Los Angeles’ judicially noticed facts included urban rebellion, crime,
poverty, racial, ethnic, and national origin discrimination, and police violence, as well
as spatial segregation, particularly in communities and neighborhoods. Id. Like Renton,
women and sex work involve sex workers with First Amendment protected as “target.”
Id. Like Detroit, Los Angeles had its own rebellions—1965 Watts and 1992 South
Central where both rebellions which occurred in identifiably Black communities. Id. In
both Detroit and Los Angeles, Blacks migrating from the South made it imperative that
black and brown communities be isolated and contained. Id. Eventually, Los Angeles
would elect a Black mayor at a time when patterns of Black and Brown enfranchisement
led whites to flee to Los Angeles’ suburbs and beyond. Id. Los Angeles’ municipal nar-
rative also relied on facts from LaRue. Id. Although Rehnquist was the only member of
the Court to hear both LaRue in 1973 and Alameda Books in 2002, the First Amendment
analysis in both cases appear to share a narrative about sexually explicit speech, sex,
and public accommodations. Id. This narrative is based, in part, on the threat the sex-
ually explicit speech in both cases appeared to pose to decency and civility. Id.
222. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 44, 51.
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it was reasonable for Renton to legislate prophylactically.225 Renton
had no duty to wait for the negative effects to manifest themselves
before it was empowered to act in this way.226 Like Detroit and Los
Angeles, Renton’s evidence was rendered more credible by the real
threat posed by the Green River Valley killer who targeted women
sex workers, substance abusers, and runaways.227 This urban narra-
tive was a cautionary tale about race and sex that seemed to blame
women for the dangers they faced at the hands of a serial killer.228
The reasonableness of these municipal narratives was enhanced
by federal policies intended to wage wars on crime, drugs, poverty,
and smut.229 The primary battlegrounds on which these wars were
waged were the inner-city neighborhoods in cities like Detroit and
Los Angeles.230 The crime, drugs, poverty, and smut against which
the federal wars were waged proved not only the secondary effects
of commercialized indecent speech, but also the real threat posed by
the continuing devastation in which many poor people in urban
centers lived.231
225. Id. at 44, 52.
226. Id.
227. See Silja A. Talvi, The Truth About the Green River Killer, THE TYEE (Nov. 12,
2003), https://thetyee.ca/Views/2003/11/12/The_Truth_About_the_Green_River_Killer/
[https://perma.cc/9K7F-E5PP].
228. See id. In Renton, the Green River Killer and the over 40 women he murdered
demonstrated the reasonableness of Renton’s ordinance because Renton and Seattle
faced the same threat. See id. For Renton, the “urban life” narrative was a cautionary
tale driven by gender and racial impropriety. In the public’s imagination, women and sex
workers prove the need for regulations to reduce the potential for the danger that is real,
rather than speculative. Id. When asked why he killed so many women, Ridgway replied,
“I thought I was doing you guys a favor, killing prostitutes . . . Here you guys can’t con-
trol them, but I can.” Id. Ridgway’s killing spree allows Renton to rely on a cautionary
tale of sexual impropriety. This is what could happen to women who failed to follow the
rules. The narrative made Renton’s reliance on Seattle’s data reasonable because both
municipalities arguably faced the same threat. This placed Renton under siege, but
Renton chose to legislate in way that increased, rather than ameliorated, the vulnera-
bility of those affiliated with the adult entertainment industry or sex work. These workers
were not part of the public in whose interest Renton legislated. Rather, they were what
threatened the public on whose behalf Renton enacted the ordinance.
229. See id. Hendrixson, supra note 129; Jeff Guo, America’s Tough Approach to Policing
Black Communities Began as a Liberal Idea, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/02/americas-tough-approach-to-policing-black
-communities-began-as-a-liberal-idea [https://perma.cc/YDY6-V3QL] (President Lyndon
B. Johnson simultaneously waged wars on poverty and crime that are responsible for “the
current regime of militarized policing and mass incarceration”); see also JAMES FORMAN,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN (2017) (detailing the efforts of the District of Columbia Courts to
deal with crime and drugs in Washington which were overseen by an increasingly black
bench). See generally OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE
NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965); The LBJ Library, Commencement
Speech at Howard University, 6/4/65. MP2265-66, YOUTUBE (June 4, 1965), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcfAuodA2x8 [https://perma.cc/HU5C-NH4A].
230. See Guo, supra note 229.
231. See id. See generally BOYD, supra note 218; JOHNSON, supra note 221.
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With time, the government’s evidentiary burden decreases
because the Court judicially notices a priori presumptions about
commercialized indecency and its negative secondary effects.232 As
the presumptions become virtually irrebuttable, they become more
pernicious.233 The evidentiary burdens weigh heavily in favor of mu-
nicipalities and against the individual proprietors of the zoned busi-
nesses.234 This is unfair to the individual proprietors who challenge
the constitutionality of the zoning ordinances. Over time, challengers
are expected to proffer evidence and the municipalities are not.235 As
local governments are required to proffer less evidence to demonstrate
the reasonableness of their choice, the courts give these choices a
higher level of judicial deference than they would otherwise receive.236
By 2003, cities like Los Angeles have an affirmative burden to
establish the ordinance-secondary effects nexus with “evidence that
supports a link between concentrations of adult operations and
asserted secondary effects . . . .”237 They do not, however, “bear the
burden of providing evidence that rules out every theory for the link
between concentrations of adult establishments that is inconsistent
with [their] own.”238 This seems to be a requirement reserved for the
challengers.239
As the object of the regulation shifts from where businesses can
operate to the speech inside those businesses, the state and local
232. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 459 (2002) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
233. See id.
234. Meepos, supra note 157, at 239.
235. See id.
236. E.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440. In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Justice Souter noted, “the lesser scrutiny applied to content-correlated zoning restrictions
is no excuse for a government’s failure to provide a factual demonstration for claims it
makes about secondary effects; on the contrary, this is what demands the demonstra-
tion.” Id. at 459. Souter continued,
the government has not shown that bookstores containing viewing booths,
isolated from other adult establishments, increase crime or produce other
negative secondary effects in surrounding neighborhoods, and we are thus
left without substantial justification for viewing the city’s First Amendment
restriction as content correlated but not simply content based. By the same
token, the city has failed to show any causal relationship between the breakup
policy and elimination or regulation of secondary effects.
Id. at 425. In his concurring opinion in the same case, Justice Kennedy accuses the plural-
ity of rushing to reach the quantum of evidence question without first answering the
following question, “what proposition does a city need to advance in order to sustain a
secondary-effects ordinance?” Id. at 449. While Kennedy agrees with the plurality’s answer
to the quantum question, he disagrees with the plurality because it fails to address the
sufficiency of the interests Los Angeles claims the challenged ordinance furthers. Id.
237. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 437 (2002).
238. Id.
239. See Meepos, supra note 157, at 239.
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governments’ evidentiary requirement changes.240 Initially, munici-
palities appear to be required to proffer the same type of credible
evidence to support the conclusion that the regulated businesses come
with harmful secondary effects.241 By the time the Court decides
Barnes and Pap’s A.M., however, state and local governments are re-
lieved of any significant evidentiary burden to support claims about
the negative secondary effects of nude dancing that the public nudity
laws are intended to prevent.242 Both the cause and the effect of pub-
lic nudity is universalized based on precedent that, when extended
beyond zoning in the particular locations in which the cases arose,
is stretched beyond recognition.243 It may be perfectly acceptable for
240. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296–97 (2000) (plurality opinion);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (Souter, J., concurring) (1991).
241. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72 (1981). In Schad, for
example, the Court concluded Mount Ephraim’s ban on all live entertainment was
unconstitutional unless Mount Ephraim could proffer credible evidence that live
entertainment posed a particular threat to the municipality’s character that would
warrant banning “a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the
protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 65. According to the Court,
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. involved a “restriction on the location of adult
movie theaters [that] imposed a minimal burden on protected speech.” Id. at 71. Detroit’s
ordinance “did not affect the number of adult movie theaters that could operate in the city;
it merely dispersed them.” Id. Without evidence of both the asserted interest in preserving
the character of life in Mount Ephraim and the real, not speculative, threat posed by all
live entertainment, Mount Ephraim’s ban was far more than a “minimal burden on
protected speech.” Id. The Court noted that the Borough’s assertions about the negative
impact of live entertainment including the adult entertainment at issue in the case on
the quality of life in Mount Ephraim were not “immediately apparent as a matter of
experience.” Id. at 73. This is linked to the spatial narrative on which the municipality
attempted to rely, which was at odds with life in Mount Ephraim. The Borough did not
have its own history of blight, poverty, and other indicators of compromised quality of life.
See About Us, Borough of Lawnside, http://lawnside.net/about [https://perma.cc/B5AJ
-2A4X] (regarding the history of Lawnside, New Jersey); A Brief History of the Borough
of Mount Ephraim, Borough of Mount Ephraim, NJ (2011), https://www.mountephraim
-nj.com/history.html [https://perma.cc/PJF5-PC79]. It was also not close enough to a mu-
nicipality with that kind of history such as Camden or Philadelphia. Id. It is interesting
to note that the closest majority Black municipality is Lawnside which has a higher
median household income than Mount Ephraim. Id. Although Lawnside is the oldest in-
dependent Black municipality above the Mason-Dixon line and is almost 90 percent Black,
it is not poor. Id. The spatial narrative about Mount Ephraim simply could not support
the presumption. Id. The racial makeup of the municipality, as well as its proximity to
other, identifiably Black municipalities did not jibe with Mount Ephraim’s asserted con-
clusion that live entertainment would have a deleterious effect on the quality of life in
Mount Ephraim. Id. The Court found Mount Ephraim’s claim was supported by “no evi-
dence, and it is not immediately apparent as a matter of experience, that live entertain-
ment poses problems of this nature more significant than those associated with various
permitted uses.” Schad, 452 U.S. at 73.
242. Calvert & Richards, supra note 142, at 293–94 (examining eleven lower federal
court cases decided after City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. and concluding, inter
alia, that “the deferential approach most courts take with regard to legislative judgments
about the regulation of sexually oriented business unduly restricts adult entertainment
and the First Amendment”).
243. Id. at 320–22.
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the Supreme Court to accept what the highest state court has recog-
nized as a connection between public indecency and the negative
secondary effects of that indecency in that state. The same cannot
be said, however, for the universal precedential value granted to
decisions originally limited to specific places where the evidence and
larger narrative about the details of urban life appear to prove the
truth and logic of the connection between public accommodations
featuring commercialized indecency and the negative secondary
effects of adult entertainment.244 In Barnes and Pap’s A.M., the
Court determined Indiana and Erie acted reasonably when they
identified public nudity as anathema to the community’s moral and
social code.245 The evidence on which state and local governments
can rely include court opinions in which the relationship between
adult entertainment and negative effects of the commercialized
indecency has been judicially noticed.246
Although the Court has not identified with any specificity the
exact quantum of evidence a municipality must proffer, there should
be a minimum requirement that the evidence be both geographically
specific and contemporaneous.247 If the absence of this type of evi-
dentiary threshold is problematic in zoning cases, then it is even
more troubling in the public nudity and stripping cases. Indeed, by
the time the Court decides Barnes and Pap’s A.M., the Court accepts
the idea that public nudity is something state and local govern-
ments have a substantial interest in eliminating.248 Geographically
specific and particularized narratives about the danger of stripping
and strip culture are no longer required.249 Reading Luke Records,
Inc., Barnes, and Pap’s A.M. together seems to clarify the nature
and the magnitude of the threat posed by this slice of Black popular
culture.250 The cases also demonstrate how the Secondary Effects
Doctrine permits stripping to be regulated in ways that stripper
anthems and other Black popular music cannot.251 This is largely
244. Compare Schad, 452 U.S. at 76–77 (Mount Ephraim could not make this showing
by mere recitation; rather, some evidence had to be proffered to render the ordinance
reasonable), with City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 297 (2000) (plurality opinion),
and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting
the Court reasonably relied on studies from other localities to confirm the secondary
effects of nude dancing establishments).
245. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (1991)
(Souter, J., concurring); see Adler, supra note 35, at 1140–54 (discussing the “[t]ropes of
the [d]angerous [b]ody” at work in Barnes and Pap’s A.M.).
246. See, e.g., Calvert & Richards, supra note 142, at 323.
247. Id. at 323–25.
248. E.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986).
249. E.g., id. at 51–52; see also Calvert & Richards, supra note 142, at 322–23.
250. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 297 (plurality opinion); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570–71,
584 (Souter, J., concurring); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).
251. Compare Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 291–93 (plurality opinion), and Barnes, 501 U.S.
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due to at least two reasons. First, Like Records, Inc. concluded it
was improper to resolve questions about “contemporary community
standards” in a bench trial where the judge claimed to represent the
community and to embrace its contemporary standards.252 Second,
the judge in the 2 Live Crew case dismissed the evidence proffered
by 2 Live Crew in favor of evidence not proffered by the sheriff.253
Both of these were significant errors on which the Circuit Court based
its reversal.254 This outcome, however, is not guaranteed under sec-
ondary effects because of the accepted universality of the threat due
to beliefs about the music and its impact on social order and de-
cency.255 There is no need for a particular state or municipal narra-
tive about the negative secondary effects in either South Bend,
Indiana or Erie, Pennsylvania. The municipal and state presumption
about the relationship between the regulated speech and public ac-
commodations, on the one hand, and the secondary effects of that
public speech, on the other hand, is either replaced or augmented by
a judicially created presumption that sexually explicit speech a priori
has secondary effects unrelated to the content of the speech.256 Con-
sequently, states and municipalities can legislate to prevent those
secondary effects even where there is neither direct nor circumstan-
tial evidence of the connection.
CONCLUSION
While the messages expressed by both stripping and the music
to which strippers dance are essentially the same, the First Amend-
ment does not require the speech to be treated similarly.257 The danc-
ing can be banned if it is indecent.258 The music can be banned only
at 585 (Souter, J., concurring), with Luke Records v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138–39
(11th Cir. 1992).
252. Luke Records, 960 F.2d at 138–39.
253. Id. at 137.
254. Id. at 138–39.
255. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 583–84 (Souter, J., concurring); Kelley, supra note 18, at 62–63.
256. See Alemzadeh, supra note 35, at 362; see, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (Souter,
J., concurring). Indiana could justify enforcing its generally applicable public nudity law
to ban nude dancing inside public accommodations by extending the assumption on which
the United States Supreme Court relied in its opinion in Renton. See generally City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). That is, the Court makes the local
and state-specific presumptions of Renton and Northend Cinema universally applicable
to all similar cases the Supreme Court might consider. By the time the Court considers
South Bend, Indiana’s public nudity ordinance, the relationship between commercialized
public indecency (particularly totally nude dancing/stripping) is a priori; hence, there no
longer appears to be a need to proffer any evidence. See id.
257. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118 (conceding that “some of the performances to which these
regulations address themselves are within the limits of the constitutional protection of
freedom of expression . . .”); see Wahlquist, supra note 22.
258. Wahlquist, supra note 22, at 708.
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if it is obscene.259 Just as stripping is predominated by women’s
speech, the music to which they dance is predominated by men’s
speech, which is often about strippers. The First Amendment rein-
forces the value of strippers as objects in stories told by men rather
than as subjects whose speech allows them to tell their own stories.260
The corporeal speech expressed by women’s nude dancing can be
prohibited because to do so not only serves a legitimate government
interest unrelated to the speech, i.e., addressing negative secondary
effects, but also incidentally burdens how the strippers’ messages
are understood.261 The First Amendment’s Secondary Effects Doc-
trine strips women voices from legitimate political and public dis-
course about sex and sexuality, and privileges men’s voices that tell
stories about women over the women whose stripping tells their own
stories.262 While these problems exist in the zoning cases, they are
exacerbated when the Secondary Effects Doctrine turns inward to
regulate the speech inside strip clubs.263 If women’s speech was pro-
tected to the same extent that the First Amendment protects the
music, then women could speak for themselves and fully access what
Audre Lorde calls the “erotic as power” as subjects rather than ob-
jects.264 This is a more satisfying and liberating approach to resolving
the tension that exists between the constitutional rights of strippers,
musicians, and the owners and proprietors of the adult entertain-
ment establishments that feature both the strippers’ corporeal speech
and the rappers’ musical speech.
259. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 135–36 (11th Cir. 1992).
260. See supra Section II.B.
261. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 295 (2000) (plurality opinion).
262. See Weinstein, supra note 156, at 881–88.
263. See supra Part IV.
264. LORDE, supra note 6, at 53–59.
